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1、2018年我们那边农村零散居住的，家家户户都要在自家门口装摄像头，自费，要求录像内容保存90天，不装派出所就给你家门上贴封条，当时家里花费两千多。不知道是监控谁，哪里有贼呢，90天，这比五星饭店监控留存时间都长。

2、然后要在菜刀上打上二维码钢印，信息与身份证绑定，菜刀要上锁链与厨房某处固定。购买罐装液化气要登记身份证。去加油站加油，买油需要村委会开证明，要登记。我只觉得，为什么不把所有带刃的都用铁链锁上（所有农具），还有汽车拖拉机，那东西威力更大。

3、那段时间还会突击检查所谓爆炸物，不由分说把你家里里外外翻个遍。家里种果树的，有种叫石硫合剂的药用于防止果树树皮被虫咬，那药就是石灰和硫磺熬制而成。当时还剩下往年的几公斤成药在院子里被发现了父母还被盘问了很久。好像所有人都是恐怖分子。

4、2019年起村里每周组织升国旗，汉人轮流在村口站岗放哨，遇到陌生人要登记。（不知道是防谁，不知道岗为谁站）。维族男同胞就更惨，都是农民，4-7月却被安排每天白天集中训练踢正步，走队列之类的类似军训活动，没人管你田里面是不是荒了，没人管你收入。（他们是农民吗）

5、镇子上的交通要道都有设卡，汉族人可以随意通行，少数民族70岁以下要接受身份证登记和盘问检查（要求打开手机让警察、辅警随意翻看）。

6、2018年下半年到2019年初，有个所谓的”两项工作“，不知道具体代表什么，反正我们看到的内容就是，我们当地男女老少不分民族都被采集了血液DNA，全部10个手指的指纹、虹膜扫描，这事儿是穿军装的医生在登记和整理样本。很多农民干活儿的指纹都磨掉了，还被呵斥。

7、镇子中心原来是幼儿园小学居民区（都是平房）围绕着政府机关大楼，后来搞新农村平房全都推掉盖楼，但是后面盖所有的楼都离机关大楼五百米以上距离，机关大楼周围极其空旷，都是绿地。

8、过年过节的时候镇子中心几条主干道上百米一哨，一哨三人，（有一人是配步枪，三人配一辆警用摩托），另有巡逻车巡逻。（我们镇子两万人不到，没想到会需要一个一百多人的这个队伍，这人员费用，这装备，钱花在教育上不好吗）

9、新疆棉花很热，10年前，从小学三年级到高二，每年学校都组织学生拾棉花20天到一个月。每人每天有任务，超额给劳务费。我们那现在确实都机械化采棉了，因为找不到人拾棉花，人工费太贵了。机器采摘的棉花脏得要死，评级下降，价格也下降。十年前人工采摘的棉花能卖10元一公斤，采摘人工费1块到一块五一公斤，厉害的一天能摘棉花150公斤，摘90公斤以上稍微努努力就能达到。我当时一天还能拾100公斤棉花。现在机器采棉能卖6块钱一公斤就不错了。个别人工采摘的要花2块五一公斤人工费。10前有采棉大军秋季去新疆，勤劳肯干的夫妻两个过去三个月能挣个五万块钱然后回家过年，种棉花的农民也能一年挣十几万。现在农民也没钱赚，也没有人去新疆当季节工采棉花了。今年棉花事件后，预感棉花价钱要更烂了，看看最后为爱国买单的是不是还是那些农民。

10、对我们实打实的影响是

11、我曾经也是不怎么红的小粉红，曾经觉得政治离我及其遥远，那是高层的事儿。生活给我上课。也要感谢文昭老师。

12、去过瑞士的朋友都知道那里有多美，我认为新疆和瑞士一样美，可是有人就把它毁了。当局的模糊，宣传上的问题，让国内有不少朋友（被塑造）以异样的眼光看新疆人。他们不认同所谓疆独（我也不），可是却认同对新疆的强力管制，说就是该好好管管，不管得狠一点哪有内地的太平日子。这在我看来就很分裂，你即不允许她独立，也不把那里的人当做同胞，认为他们就是二等公民。那你在心底里有把他们当做一家人嘛？反正当我坐车去市里，过卡子时警察要求维族同胞全部下车接受检查的时候，我觉得很脸红。（我就有这样分裂的好朋友，我认为这种分裂，国内舆论要背锅，自己的不思考也要背锅）（国内之前有过清理新疆籍维族同胞遣送回疆内的行动，我也因为身份证新疆的住旅店受到过异样关怀）

13、在新疆，你可以每天切切实实地看到无数次人的隐私就这么切切实实地被随意侵犯。穿制服的任何人，哪怕是保安都可以没有行政文件就随意搜查你，搜你家。还有好多浪费社会资源的蠢事儿就在那里，就在你眼皮子底下每天重复发生。新疆是不是监狱我不知道，但是那里的百姓确实活得像囚徒。老百姓啥都能忍，只要能活着，能有口饭吃。简单的离开只是少数人可以做的选择。更深的问题我没看到的，就不写了。所有对于新疆的关注都令我高兴，希望聚光灯打过来的时候，就是情况开始慢慢变好的时候。虽然原来胡在的时候感觉情况也没有像内地那么好，但是现在想起来，那会儿还就是新疆氛围最好的时候了。维汉百姓间可以自发合作交流，经济活动受到的干扰也比较小，现在就是强制割裂，让老百姓互相防着，制造隔阂，还到处贴民族团结。我只想说，如果我党真的爱国爱疆，就不会把事情做成上面这样。

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远古的燃烧


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The missing successor - China’s most senior officials endorse economic plans for years ahead

But they left one little thing out

China 中国

Oct 31st 2020 edition 2020年10月31日版

Almost exactly ten years ago, in a typically roundabout way, China made clear who its next leader would be. A man who, not long earlier, had been far less famous than his folk-singer wife was made vice-chairman of the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission. Sure enough, two years later, he took charge of the party and the armed forces and became China’s most powerful ruler since Mao Zedong. Were precedent to be followed, a meeting of senior officials in Beijing this week would have provided just such a clue about who would succeed Xi Jinping. It provided nothing of the sort.

That is no surprise. When China’s constitution was revised in 2018 to scrap a limit of two five-year terms for the post of state president, which Mr Xi also holds, it was a clear signal that he did not wish to step down when his ten years were up. As head of the party, he was not bound by any term limit. But his predecessor, Hu Jintao, had given up both party and state roles in quick succession. Mr Xi had been expected to follow Mr Hu’s lead.

For anyone still in doubt about Mr Xi’s intentions, the party’s just-concluded meeting gave a hint as obvious as the one in 2010 that heralded his rise to power. A communiqué issued on October 29th, at the end of the four-day conclave of its roughly 370-strong Central Committee, said the gathering had endorsed “recommendations” for a five-year economic plan and a blueprint for China’s development until 2035 (full details of these had yet to be published when The Economist went to press). But it made no mention of any new civilian* appointment to the military commission.

The post of vice-chairman is an important one for any future leader to hold before taking over. Mr Hu got the job three years before he became general secretary. Without experience of how military command works, a party chief may find it hard to assert control over the army. There are still two uniformed vice-chairmen. But the continuing absence of a civilian* at that level means China has no leader-in-waiting when time has all but run out to start learning the ropes before the party’s 20th congress in 2022. A civilian* vice-chairman would also be a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee. But a reshuffle of that seven-member body in 2017 did not include anyone of the usual sort of age of someone being groomed for succession.

There are occasional complaints in China about Mr Xi’s seeming determination to hold power indefinitely. In August Cai Xia, a public intellectual, was expelled from the party and stripped of her pension by its most prestigious academy for training leaders, the Central Party School, where she had studied and taught for 20 years before retiring. Among comments that apparently resulted in her punishment was her description of Mr Xi’s scrapping of the two-term limit as something the Central Committee had been forced to swallow “like dog shit”. Ms Cai is now abroad.

But in so far as can be guessed from China’s opaque political workings, Mr Xi remains as powerful as ever and seemingly fit enough to keep going well beyond 2022. He will turn 69 that year—by convention too old to remain in office, but that is not a hard-and-fast rule. While liberals like Ms Cai grumble—as, no doubt, do those who have suffered as a result of his ruthless campaign against corruption and his political purges—there is little sign of strong anti-Xi sentiment among the public.

In some ways this has been a good year for Mr Xi, with many Chinese proud of their country’s success in crushing covid-19 and getting the economy back on track. Party propagandists have been working hard to boost such sentiment. The term “people’s leader”, rarely applied to his post-Mao predecessors, is sometimes used in state media when referring to Mr Xi (the Politburo used it for the first time last December).

It may also, however, be an anxious time behind closed doors. Party congresses rubber-stamp decisions that have been made in secret beforehand. Even though the next one is still two years away, the build-up is a tense time in Chinese politics as leaders bargain over policy and appointments. The party’s 18th congress, at which Mr Xi came to power, followed a protracted political struggle highlighted by the dramatic downfall of Bo Xilai, a contender for highest office. There is no sign that Mr Xi faces another such challenge. But in July the party launched a pilot scheme in a handful of places for a new purge, this time aimed at the judiciary, police and secret police. One stated aim is to root out “two-faced people” who are disloyal to the party. It will be rolled out nationwide next year and wrap up early in 2022, a few months before the 20th congress.

It is not yet clear how Mr Xi intends to exercise his power beyond the congress. He could simply keep his current positions. Another rumoured option is that he might prefer an even grander title than that of general secretary, which has not always indicated that the holder wields supreme power. In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping, whose authority stemmed from his position as chairman of the military commission, sacked two general secretaries; Mr Hu became general secretary in 2002 but remained overshadowed by his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who held on to the crucial military position until 2004. Mr Xi could revive the title of party chairman (abolished in 1982) and raise himself to the great helmsman’s hallowed level.

He will certainly use the congress to install more of his protégés. By that time the prime minister, Li Keqiang, will have served his constitutionally mandated maximum of two terms. Mr Li was not installed by Mr Xi, who may look forward to appointing someone closer to him. Unusually, there is no obvious person who has the experience (serving as deputy prime minister is usually a prerequisite), is the right kind of age (67 or younger is the norm) and crucially, who is close to Mr Xi. Leaving this choice until closer to the time may not bother him, however. Since Mr Xi became leader, the prime ministership has become less important. He has taken over its core responsibility: directing the economy.

The biggest unknown is who would emerge as China’s paramount leader if Mr Xi suddenly becomes unable to rule, as a result of death or illness. There is no clear line of succession within the party—without Mr Xi, no one in the currently 25-member Politburo would stand head and shoulders above the rest. Younger leaders, such as the party chief of the south-western region of Chongqing, Chen Min’er, who has long been tipped as a forerunner for post-Xi leadership, may lack sufficient seniority to take over in an emergency. Mr Xi’s sudden departure could plunge China into political turmoil.

The Central Committee’s just-concluded meeting may have made Mr Xi’s plan to retain power in 2022 even more certain. It has done nothing to instil confidence in China’s political future. ■

*这几处的「civilian」究竟是什么意思？翻译成平民应该是错的。我赞且蒙在鼓里...

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The kind of people who participate in and lead violent revolutions are (for the most part) authoritarians. If they are not actually members of the military they are militarily inclined: accustomed to solving problems through violence and physical domination; suspicious of outsiders, whom they view as potential spies, assassins, and saboteurs; given to quick, authoritative decisions rather than slow, philosophical deliberation... It does not matter what ideology such people espouse when they are fighting battles to achieve political dominance; once they have it, they do not have the skills or worldviews that would lead them to create or foster liberal democratic forms of governance.

Revolutions that lead to democracies are usually popular independence break-offs, as in the US and Indian revolutions, where the 'old' rule is locally weak, distant, and not threatened with complete destruction. Loyalists to the old regime leave and return to the homeland, the previous rulers have the remains of their regime to govern, and the new rulers merely need to secure their borders and not worry too much about counter-revolutionary movements or reactionary insurgents. That gives everyone a sense of space and peace that lets them build more healthy, democratic regimes. In places like Syria or Libya, where the old regime has to be actually and actively destroyed, and loyalists have nowhere else to go, it would take enormous presence of mind for the new leader to create democratic institutions, because she/he would have to accept the risks of giving full liberties to old-rule loyalists.

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• 中国人没有勇谋，所以建立不起民主。

ta们可能还会说，大多数人都不敢挑战权威，所以中国人是劣等生物。ta们说这话的时候有没有把自己也算在那大多数人里，我赞且蒙在鼓里。可能还有人借“我没有出生在中国/东亚”，试图为自己的劣等血统洗脱罪名(๑◔‿◔๑)

• 中国文化不行，建立不起民主。

• 中国人到了国外还是不愿意接触新的信息，骨子里就没有民主制度下所需的学习能力，自己画地为牢。

• 真的耶，我身边的中国人都那样，都是小粉红

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youtu.be/oBIfENyvpCs

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Vileness is the passport for the vile,

Loftiness is the epitaph of the lofty.

Look, in that gilded heaven

There throngs the fluttering reflections of the dead.

An ice age has ended,

Why are glaciers still omnipresent on the earth?

The Cape of Good Hope has been discovered,

Why is the Dead Sea still swarmed with racing sails?

I arrived in this world,

Carrying only a shadow, a rope and paper,

To convey the manifestos of the judged,

Before the final verdict is passed:

To tell you, world,

I -- do -- not -- believe!

If one thousand challengers lie beneath your feet,

Then let me become the one thousand and first.

I don't believe in the blue of the sky,
I don't believe in the roars from the thunder.
I don't believe that dreams are illusory,
I don't believe that death let all sins end up.

If the ocean is destined to burst the dike,

Then let all the bitterness pour into my heart;

If the continent is destined to rise,

Then let humans choose a new peak to abide.

A new transition and sparkling stars,

They are the hieroglyphs of five thousand years,

They are the staring eyes of the future.

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youtu.be/bYKNJ--GHGU

November 13, 2017 - Closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of a North Korean soldier daring escape through the DMZ at the JSA site.

2017年十一月13日，闭路电视（CCTV）记录下了一个朝鲜士兵，试图在JSA处（中文wiki：共同警备区）「叛逃」DMZ中文wiki：朝韩非军事区）。

The KPA defector uses a military vehicle to cross the 72-hour Bridge.

Unfortunately, the defector gets the vehicle stuck along the row of JSA buildings.

The KPA initial response is to chase after.

The defector makes a run south across the MDL as KPA soldiers engage him with direct fire.

A KPA soldier briefly crosses the MDL before returning back to the north side of the JSA.

The JSA security battalion’s rescues the defector just prior to his medical evacuation for treatment.

JSA安全营（找不到官方中文翻译）救起了该脱北者，然后立即施以「医疗后送」。

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https://zh-classical.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%AF%9B%E6%BE%A4%E6%9D%B1

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