我很好奇布佛是谁，别人的名字都是命名发现发明等等，他这个......真•遗臭万年

@洛天依言和江泽民 #110879

首先同意burleigh的观点，house rule是非常关键、决定性的部分。不过我感觉楼主的意思比较偏向政策性的干预，所以我想试着讨论一下法律和政府的干预......

我的看法是真理只会越辩越明。推特上造谣反贼那么多，现在推特中文键政圈不也没人欣赏了么，长期就那几个「正义反共」号自娱自乐。还有品韭，谁都知道是姨学狂热分子的沼气池。至于胡说八道，既然言论自由，就会有很多人提出。就好比闫梦丽的科研结果被各路人怀疑，就是因为墙外有良好的言论自由基础；反观没有基础的品韭，批评闫梦丽和法轮功可能会被观察，观察又影响经验，因此胡说八道才能畅通无阻(๑◔‿◔๑)。如果真有言论自由，由于如上原因，战狼nmelses也不会吃香了，这就系良币驱逐劣币。

至于德国纳粹上台等极端民粹主义的体现，缺乏言论自由以及当时蛀满bug的所谓民主制不能被忽略，以及另一个关键——经济的跌宕起伏。其实不只是德国，其他民粹主义崛起的国家都有很足的假民主历史，还有政治迫害，经济萧条等。例如习班牙内战，例如十月革命前夕的俄罗斯。

最关键的是，制定这样的一系列法条会不会妨碍法治。不如采取中和措施，给已证伪的帖子贴上谣言警告。如果一个帐号有太多警告，那自然就被群嘲了。实际上民众是非常多样化的，而且由于一个言论自由的环境能允许各类人马，从killregdragon到贴吧大牛，在观点的大碰撞里，民众的思考能力必然会有所增强，变得更加精明。用后果衡量罪行轻重我觉得是个好办法，那么胡说八道就不用受罚，除非这个人的谣言造成的影响力给社会带来了真实伤害，例如造成巨大恐慌导致局部商业系统宕机等等。

所以对于你的问题，我青年做题家的回答是不封帐号，但标注「此贴为虚假信息的可能性很高」一类的东西，附上查证结果的链接。如果没人反驳，那就注册小号亲自反驳，反正编的东西永远会有逻辑漏洞，就好象没有十全十美的代码一样。

从古罗马到现在，都可以，我想找几个专门做研究。想了半天想不出来，就来提问了...

谢谢了！

@清华博士豆沙馅 #110765 吼哇！

The missing successor - China’s most senior officials endorse economic plans for years ahead

缺席的继承人——中国的老资历们认可未来数年的经济计划

But they left one little thing out

但他们漏下了一样东西

China 中国

Oct 31st 2020 edition 2020年10月31日版

Almost exactly ten years ago, in a typically roundabout way, China made clear who its next leader would be. A man who, not long earlier, had been far less famous than his folk-singer wife was made vice-chairman of the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission. Sure enough, two years later, he took charge of the party and the armed forces and became China’s most powerful ruler since Mao Zedong. Were precedent to be followed, a meeting of senior officials in Beijing this week would have provided just such a clue about who would succeed Xi Jinping. It provided nothing of the sort.

大约在十年前，中国以一种拐弯抹角的方式确定了谁将成为下一届领导人。这个被选为共产党中央军委会副主席的男人，不久前还远远不如他那身为民族歌唱家的妻子有名。无疑的是，两年后，他就掌管了党和军队，成为了中国继毛泽东之后最有权力的领袖。按照先例，北京的高层们将在这个星期举行会议，透露关于习近平接班人的重要线索。然而，本次会议打破了这项传统。

That is no surprise. When China’s constitution was revised in 2018 to scrap a limit of two five-year terms for the post of state president, which Mr Xi also holds, it was a clear signal that he did not wish to step down when his ten years were up. As head of the party, he was not bound by any term limit. But his predecessor, Hu Jintao, had given up both party and state roles in quick succession. Mr Xi had been expected to follow Mr Hu’s lead.

这并没有什么值得惊奇的。当中国在2018年修改了宪法，取消了国家主席两届任期的限制时，这已经传递了一个清晰的信号——他不希望在十年任期结束后下台。作为一党之首，他不受任期限制。但是他的前任——胡锦涛，接连放弃了自己在党和国家中的职务。大家本来期待习先生可以遵守胡先生的先例的。

For anyone still in doubt about Mr Xi’s intentions, the party’s just-concluded meeting gave a hint as obvious as the one in 2010 that heralded his rise to power. A communiqué issued on October 29th, at the end of the four-day conclave of its roughly 370-strong Central Committee, said the gathering had endorsed “recommendations” for a five-year economic plan and a blueprint for China’s development until 2035 (full details of these had yet to be published when The Economist went to press). But it made no mention of any new civilian* appointment to the military commission.

对于任何仍然在怀疑习先生动机的人来说，共产党刚刚结束的会议，透露出了一个暗示，与2010年的那次预示习近平掌权的会议一样明显。在十月29日，大约390中央委员参加、为期四日的秘密会议的结尾，发表的一个公告称，这次会议同意了关于中国经济的五年计划、中国未来发展蓝图（直到2035年）的“建议”。至于这两项的具体细节，《经济学人》付印时，仍尚未公布。但是它没有提到任何有关军委会任员的事情。

The post of vice-chairman is an important one for any future leader to hold before taking over. Mr Hu got the job three years before he became general secretary. Without experience of how military command works, a party chief may find it hard to assert control over the army. There are still two uniformed vice-chairmen. But the continuing absence of a civilian* at that level means China has no leader-in-waiting when time has all but run out to start learning the ropes before the party’s 20th congress in 2022. A civilian* vice-chairman would also be a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee. But a reshuffle of that seven-member body in 2017 did not include anyone of the usual sort of age of someone being groomed for succession.

在正式上任前先任职副主席，这对任何的未来领导人都是非常重要的。胡锦涛在上任以前三年拿到了这个职位。如果没有军事指挥的经验，党的最高领导人可能会在军队控制上遇到困难。现在仍然有两位身穿制服的副主席，但是持续缺乏站在这个高度的文官，意味着中国其实没有候选的领导人——要想在2022年的20大会议之前熟悉门道，时间已经所剩无几。一个无军事背景的副主席也可以是中央政治局常委会的一员。但是，2017年中央政治局常委会7位成员的重新洗牌，并没有包含任何有合适年龄、可以做继承人的人。

There are occasional complaints in China about Mr Xi’s seeming determination to hold power indefinitely. In August Cai Xia, a public intellectual, was expelled from the party and stripped of her pension by its most prestigious academy for training leaders, the Central Party School, where she had studied and taught for 20 years before retiring. Among comments that apparently resulted in her punishment was her description of Mr Xi’s scrapping of the two-term limit as something the Central Committee had been forced to swallow “like dog shit”. Ms Cai is now abroad.

在中国，偶尔能听到关于习近平看似决定无限连任的抱怨。八月份，蔡霞，一位公共知识分子（公知），被中央党校——最具盛名的领导人培训学院，也是蔡霞退休前学习、教书长达20年的地方——开除了党籍，并剥夺退休金。在那些明显导致了她受罚结果的言论中，有一段是她对于习近平取消两届任期限制的，把它描述成「逼迫中央吞狗屎」。蔡女士现在已经在国外了。

But in so far as can be guessed from China’s opaque political workings, Mr Xi remains as powerful as ever and seemingly fit enough to keep going well beyond 2022. He will turn 69 that year—by convention too old to remain in office, but that is not a hard-and-fast rule. While liberals like Ms Cai grumble—as, no doubt, do those who have suffered as a result of his ruthless campaign against corruption and his political purges—there is little sign of strong anti-Xi sentiment among the public.

但可以从中国那不透明的政治运作中猜到的是，习近平仍然像以往一样权力强大，看起来足够适应2022年以后的发展。到那时，他就69岁了——按照惯例，年龄太大，不适合继续任职。但这个惯例并不是一成不变的。尽管像蔡霞这样的自由派会发牢骚（那些遭受了他残酷无情的反腐手段和政治大清洗的人也是如此），但在公共视野中还是很难看到任何强烈的反习迹象。

In some ways this has been a good year for Mr Xi, with many Chinese proud of their country’s success in crushing covid-19 and getting the economy back on track. Party propagandists have been working hard to boost such sentiment. The term “people’s leader”, rarely applied to his post-Mao predecessors, is sometimes used in state media when referring to Mr Xi (the Politburo used it for the first time last December).

在某些方面，今年于习近平而言，是「丰收」的一年，许多中国人都对自己国家在应对COVID-19中取得的成绩，以及之后的经济复苏、重回正轨，感到非常骄傲。党的宣传员为了让这种骄傲来的更猛烈，一直艰难困艰艰困难艰苦地工作。自毛泽东之后，「人民领袖」这个词就很少被用在他的后来人身上，但现在的国家媒体却不时用它指代习近平（政治局是在去年十一月开创了如此使用这个词的先河）。

It may also, however, be an anxious time behind closed doors. Party congresses rubber-stamp decisions that have been made in secret beforehand. Even though the next one is still two years away, the build-up is a tense time in Chinese politics as leaders bargain over policy and appointments. The party’s 18th congress, at which Mr Xi came to power, followed a protracted political struggle highlighted by the dramatic downfall of Bo Xilai, a contender for highest office. There is no sign that Mr Xi faces another such challenge. But in July the party launched a pilot scheme in a handful of places for a new purge, this time aimed at the judiciary, police and secret police. One stated aim is to root out “two-faced people” who are disloyal to the party. It will be rolled out nationwide next year and wrap up early in 2022, a few months before the 20th congress.

但是，在私下里，这也可能是习近平的一个艰难焦虑的时刻。党会橡皮图章似的做出那些事先就已秘密做出了的决定。即便下一个还是在两年后，由于领导人们在政策和职务委任上「讨价还价」，逐渐准备的过程仍然是中国政治中一个紧张的时期。在党的18届会议——也就是习近平拿到了权柄的会议之后，是一段持久的、十分剧烈的政治斗争，其高光时刻是同为主席职位竞争者的薄熙来的惨败。没有任何证据指明，习近平面临着另一个类似的挑战。但是在七月，该党在少数地方启动了一项小规模实验计划，以发动新的政治清洗，这次主要针对的是司法界、警察界和秘密警察们。一个明确目标是「清楚党内对党不忠的『两面人』」。明年，这一行动将在全国展开，并在2022年伊始、第20次全国人大之前圆满完成。

It is not yet clear how Mr Xi intends to exercise his power beyond the congress. He could simply keep his current positions. Another rumoured option is that he might prefer an even grander title than that of general secretary, which has not always indicated that the holder wields supreme power. In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping, whose authority stemmed from his position as chairman of the military commission, sacked two general secretaries; Mr Hu became general secretary in 2002 but remained overshadowed by his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who held on to the crucial military position until 2004. Mr Xi could revive the title of party chairman (abolished in 1982) and raise himself to the great helmsman’s hallowed level.

目前尚不清楚习近平将如何在大会之外的地方行使权力。他可以直接保留目前的职位。另一个流言说，他可能偏爱比「总书记」还要大的头衔。「总书记」的持有人并不总是拥有最高权力——1980年代，邓小平（权力来源于他担任的军委主席的职务），解掉了当时的两个国家主席。胡锦涛在2002年当上国家主席，但是和他的前任江泽民相比，仍然是黯然失色，后者直到2004年还担任着重要的军事职务。习近平可能会重新拿回「党主席」的头衔，尽管这一头衔在1982年就被废除了；并且把自己提升到和那位「伟大舵手」一样高的地步。

He will certainly use the congress to install more of his protégés. By that time the prime minister, Li Keqiang, will have served his constitutionally mandated maximum of two terms. Mr Li was not installed by Mr Xi, who may look forward to appointing someone closer to him. Unusually, there is no obvious person who has the experience (serving as deputy prime minister is usually a prerequisite), is the right kind of age (67 or younger is the norm) and crucially, who is close to Mr Xi. Leaving this choice until closer to the time may not bother him, however. Since Mr Xi became leader, the prime ministership has become less important. He has taken over its core responsibility: directing the economy.

毫无疑问，习近平将会利用人大安置更多的党羽。到那时，总理李克强将结束宪法规定的两届任期。李克强并没有被习近平安置。习近平可能会找一个更亲近的人来。不同寻常的是，目前没有看到明显的具有担任副总理经验（通常是担任总理的先决条件）、年龄合适（惯例是等于或低于67岁）的人，并且，关键在于，和这个人要和习近平关系密切。然而，将这个选择拖延到离20大更近的时候可能并不会使他烦恼，自从习近平成为领导人后，总理的位子就变得不那么重要了。习近平已经亲自承担了总理职务的核心责任——指导经济。

The biggest unknown is who would emerge as China’s paramount leader if Mr Xi suddenly becomes unable to rule, as a result of death or illness. There is no clear line of succession within the party—without Mr Xi, no one in the currently 25-member Politburo would stand head and shoulders above the rest. Younger leaders, such as the party chief of the south-western region of Chongqing, Chen Min’er, who has long been tipped as a forerunner for post-Xi leadership, may lack sufficient seniority to take over in an emergency. Mr Xi’s sudden departure could plunge China into political turmoil.

如果习近平翠掉，或因生病而突然无法统治，谁将成为中国的最高领导人，将成为最大的未知数。关于继承人，党内没有明确的路线。除习近平之外，现在政治局里的25个人都不会比其他人更胜一筹。年轻些的领导人，例如一直看似有望继承习近平后领导职位的中共重庆市委书记陈敏尔，可能缺乏足够的资历来在紧急中迅速接管局面。习近平若突然离开，中国可能会跌入政治动荡中。

The Central Committee’s just-concluded meeting may have made Mr Xi’s plan to retain power in 2022 even more certain. It has done nothing to instil confidence in China’s political future. ■

刚刚结束的中委会会议可能已经使习近平在2022年保留权力的计划更加确定无疑。至于采取措施来增强对中国政治前途的信心，它则一事未成。■

译者注：

*这几处的「civilian」究竟是什么意思？翻译成平民应该是错的。我赞且蒙在鼓里...

原问题+回答

The kind of people who participate in and lead violent revolutions are (for the most part) authoritarians. If they are not actually members of the military they are militarily inclined: accustomed to solving problems through violence and physical domination; suspicious of outsiders, whom they view as potential spies, assassins, and saboteurs; given to quick, authoritative decisions rather than slow, philosophical deliberation... It does not matter what ideology such people espouse when they are fighting battles to achieve political dominance; once they have it, they do not have the skills or worldviews that would lead them to create or foster liberal democratic forms of governance.

投身並領導武裝革命的人（絕大多數）都是獨裁者。就算他們不真正屬於軍隊的一員，他們也是偏向軍事化的：習慣於以暴力和物理上（而非精神上）的優勢解決問題；懷疑外人，也就是那些被它們看作潛在的敵方間諜、刺客、破壞者的人（譯者註：就像品蔥如何抓間諜一樣，恐懼自己的革命被敵手滲透）；慣於作快速的獨裁決定，而不是緩慢的哲學審思......這些爲了獲取政治主導地位而拼火的人，他們持有何種意識形態並不重要；即便他們取得勝利，他們也沒有能建立或培養自由民主政體的能力或世界觀。

投身并领导武装革命的人（绝大多数）都是独裁者。就算他们不真正属于军队的一员，他们也是偏向军事化的：习惯于以暴力和物理上（而非精神上）的优势解决问题；怀疑外人，也就是那些被它们看作潜在的敌方间谍、刺客、破坏者的人（译者注：就像品葱如何抓间谍一样，恐惧自己的革命被敌手渗透）；惯于作快速的独裁决定，而不是缓慢的哲学审思......这些为了获取政治主导地位而拼火的人，他们持有何种意识形态并不重要；即便他们取得胜利，他们也没有能建立或培养自由民主政体的能力或世界观。

Revolutions that lead to democracies are usually popular independence break-offs, as in the US and Indian revolutions, where the 'old' rule is locally weak, distant, and not threatened with complete destruction. Loyalists to the old regime leave and return to the homeland, the previous rulers have the remains of their regime to govern, and the new rulers merely need to secure their borders and not worry too much about counter-revolutionary movements or reactionary insurgents. That gives everyone a sense of space and peace that lets them build more healthy, democratic regimes. In places like Syria or Libya, where the old regime has to be actually and actively destroyed, and loyalists have nowhere else to go, it would take enormous presence of mind for the new leader to create democratic institutions, because she/he would have to accept the risks of giving full liberties to old-rule loyalists.

走向民主的革命通常都是獨立運動，就像美國和印度的革命一樣，舊規則在當地是弱的，遙遠的，不會受到「徹底破壞」的威脅的。忠誠於舊政權的人會離開並回到故土，革命前的統治者仍然擁有統治權，而革命後的新的統治者們也只需要保證領土的安全，無需過於懼怕反對革命運動的人，或者是反叛的起義。這給每個人以足夠自由的活動空間（a sense of space，這樣翻譯好麼？）和和平友愛，這樣他們就可以建造更健康、更民主的制度了。在像敘利亞和利比亞這樣的地方，舊的政權必須被真正地、積極地摧毀，舊政權的忠誠者們沒地方可去，如此，若想創建民主的體制，新的領導人就需要大費腦力，因爲他/她必須接受由「給予舊制度忠誠者完全自由」而帶來的風險。

走向民主的革命通常都是独立运动，就像美国和印度的革命一样，旧规则在当地是弱的，遥远的，不会受到「彻底破坏」的威胁的。忠诚于旧政权的人会离开并回到故土，革命前的统治者仍然拥有统治权，而革命后的新的统治者们也只需要保证领土的安全，无需过于惧怕反对革命运动的人，或者是反叛的起义。这给每个人以足够自由的活动空间（a sense of space，这样翻译好么？）和和平友爱，这样他们就可以建造更健康、更民主的制度了。在像叙利亚和利比亚这样的地方，旧的政权必须被真正地、积极地摧毁，旧政权的忠诚者们没地方可去，如此，若想创建民主的体制，新的领导人就需要大费脑力，因为他/她必须接受由「给予旧制度忠诚者完全自由」而带来的风险。

如果小粉红有大把出国旅游的钱，去欧洲飞来飞去都够，他也就不爱中国，爱西方，爱自由了，因为他有爱自由，享有自由的经济前提。

我发现出国的都是小粉红居多，其中还有不少红卫兵，这点我就很迷惑......

「过期于1846」

酵死我了

3.This is honestly one of the best game ads I've ever seen, almost the first time I've seen the Japanese portrayed as human.

这个应该是在关于二战的影视或文艺作品中妖魔化日本军的意思吧

是这个吗？

我操，我也把这个看完了。。。做得也太完美了

Ads served on YouTube are hosted there. If you can't find it, company has privacy settings on. Go into utube and do a search for it by keyword, do a google search or go into you browser history and get it from there.

或者在原界面不断刷新把它刷出来，然后截好几张图去google image搜？

quora的鏈接是2047。。。

@burleigh #110325

删贴控评了

我以为是全世界流行的饼干，，，

顺便求修宪，，，

那种年纪轻轻就处事不慌的气质，各种事情在他眼里都是平常的存在，把自己的一片精神领域维护的无可挑剔，同时又（较同行相比）富有学识的人。你总能从这种人身上发现各种交流的惊喜，甚至是一些意想不到的逻辑或知識上的契合，这就是坠吼的，坠让我好奇的

被喝茶的話可以帶零食嗎？不會被搜粗來嗎？ 那當然是帶士力架啊！

回顾起疫情前后中共国监管力度的天壤之别，有感而发。

今天的人，总觉得幸福安稳会是一辈子的事，觉得战争、政治运动、大跃进文革戒严军管集中营水晶之夜等等历史的东西都离自己非常遥远，好像一件事是历史，就意味着它将永远尘封，永不重复，在潜意识里把历史和现实严格地分离，好像两者没有联系、互不干扰，因此对风向的变化从不设防。法国1930年代报纸上的沙滩情侣也打扮的光鲜亮丽，谁能想到十几年后是否天涯两隔呢；1940年身住柏林的老百姓每天早晨上班还是一眼见到阳光灿烂的街，不过隔壁的犹太人可能一夜蒸发了；1950年回国的，谁能想到自己十几年后就可能殒命大牢？1987年考上大学的“村里的骄傲”，也绝对想不到这光明前途在短短两年后就断崖了。在那些时代，人们是极其迟钝的，但是我们今天也敏锐不到哪去。中文互联网就更糟糕了，在嘴炮乱斗里迷失自我。政治是个高级的领域，所以随便学点什么就能获得一种心理满足感。即便是随波逐流又怎样？无论是小粉红、推特反贼还是政治中间派，进步派又或是保守派，都极易落入自傲和偏见的漩涡。从小粉红和推特反贼攻击对方时各自的专注点就可以看出，小粉红可能自满于「爱国正义」「奉献精神」，反贼可能自满于「洞察社会」「智商发达」，中间派可以自满于「理客中」，三者都是因自满于一种情操、一种先进而自我窒息。互联网上碎片化的信息就好比四射的弹片，长期泡在网上的人被扎到，自己还浑然不知。

感覺唱功非常的厲害啊，而且有一種豪邁的感覺，比較符合女強人印象。

I was reading a presentation from Capt James Fanell (retired director of intelligence and information operations at U.S. Pacific Fleet) on China's Navy:

He made this statement which caught my attention.

Transcript: The Rise of China’s Navy: A Discussion with Capt. James Fanell China built between – late 2011 and through 2015 seven artificial islands in the South China Sea. And three of those islands are the same size and dimensions, in terms of geography, as Pearl Harbor. One of them is the same dimension as the beltway that goes around Washington, D.C.

Given:

• Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2015 promised not to Militarize these Islands but they have done exactly that.
• That they have been harassing US navy ships operating in the region even coming close to raming a US destroyer.
• That they have alienated many of their neighbors who claim the waters these islands inhabit. That they are risking confrontation with Japan and the US. Japan having the largest most sophisticated Airforce in the region. The US having the 1st and 2nd largest air forces (USAF, USN) in the world. And China has been actively threatening both. - China now has more hulls than the US Navy.
• China is out producing the US navy in tonnage of ships. and will for the foreseeable future.
• China has superior anti ship missiles than the US Navy (Range, Speed, Power )
• China says the sea is part of their historic territory, a claim refuted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Western Intelligence experts asserted in 2011, China is after the natural resources in the South China Sea ( oil, natural gas, fish ).

Question: Given we now understand that we badly underestimated the scale of China's militarization in the South China Sea and Navy, detailed above which seems like overkill to get natural resources; Is there a different strategic objective which they could be after by controlling that swath of ocean?

原帖地址：https://politics.stackexchange.com/questions/59336/what-is-chinas-objective-in-militarizing-the-south-china-sea

發生什麼了？被黨國攻擊了嗎？

那时候什么都比现在开放得多

毛泽东送子学农

1945年，毛岸英从苏联回来后，为让毛岸英了解中国实际，决定把毛岸英送到当时的劳动英雄吴满有处锻炼。送毛岸英的战士回来讲了个笑话：毛岸英看马既驮得他，又得驮粮食，生怕把它累坏，非要把一斗小米背自己身上。士兵向他解释，这样马驮得一般多，他才搞明白。大家听了可笑了一阵子。

来源维基百科。这是否符合父母不义子女痴呆的玄学规律？为了渲染可爱也不至于这么过头吧！

社会科学。中国古代好像从来没有过这些东西，是真的舶来品。感觉西方文化注重挖掘规律和事物本质。

太可怕了！这么多人抓住习主席的手就不放开，就要咬，习大大脖子都被啃歪了:

所幸习大大是不死真神，即使热血流尽，也岿然不动，宁可付出生命也坚定不移。

强森算不算？巨石强森

疫情不是改变我的关键，改变我的是香港反送中，不过我也是在疫情开始后才翻墙关注的，所以疫情也确实是一个时间角度上的分水岭。

疫情前我就是什么也不懂，什么也不敢想，虽然讨厌共产党但也不接触政史，虽然活得快乐岁静但总有种莫名的空虚，现在想想就是因为对世界有太多疑问，对社会还有很强的探索欲从未发泄，疑问堆积又不自知。

https://8biticon.com/

此网站可以在线制作像素头像，和2049的一样。

我是翻译爱好者，没什么深刻思想，只能通过这种方式做一点贡献了。会不定期翻译一些缺乏官方译文的，但又很精甚细腻的文章，或是紧跟时事的新闻报道。我发现这样做对个人学习很有裨益，翻译的时候经常一句话读好几遍，不愁记不住。

也不打算往墙内输出了，再也不会了。何必单恋一支墙，早点挂梯行不行。

@thphd #104349 没有任何的这个意思

经常在网上看见有人坚称，只有武装革命才能根除共产党红色恐怖的负面影响。私以为这纯粹是一派胡言一个幻梦，甚至很多人这么想只是因为武装革命有报复迫害的功能。

在品韭比较有名的那些在共产主义国家发生的武装革命或军事政变，东欧巨变，都发生在经济转型前。这显然不能为现在的党国提供暴力革命的依据，除非未来某天发生匹敌1930s级别的大萧条，或者经济差到苏联解体前的程度，不过这种无法预测的事件没有讨论意义。

我觉得，类似于「限制主席权」的和平过渡反倒是最有可能的。中国没有实现飞跃式制度进步的根基。以及，经济发展带来的满足暂时取代了中国人心中对社会问题、人权问题的不满，这意味着当今中国政府被自己的「懒政」推到了一个不能停步的位置——必须保持经济增长，否则就要面临新一波「反贼潮」——事实上，自疫情以后，已经初见端倪了。而经济下滑是逐渐的过程，再结合长期以来的言论封锁、思想管控，因此中国只有可能出现类似泰国式的温和民众运动，要求推动人权进步，保障公民自由，甚至更进一步——民主改革，但是远非武装革命。

因此我想表达的是，中国现在的政治保守派这么多，还是渐进改革容易实现。必须承认，中国运气差连番错过近现代西化机会，哪方面落后也只能接受。重点在于改变体制，建立法治。从现在的情况看，从小事推动体制改革是个很好的办法，小到文章备份，传播启蒙，创建电子刊物、论坛，大到能像泰国这样走上街头就很不错了。而中国能否维持体制改革的结果，能否维持民主自由人权的进步结果，都取决于社会能否保持住崇尚进步和学习的风气。政治冷感的冰河期是否会到来，并不在于中国以何种方式实现改革甚至政权过渡，从多大程度上抹除共产党的痕迹，事在人为，政府要做的就是不阻碍。

而我对于反共社区的希望是，能对中国各种现象、各种结构进行观察和现实分析，关注于在尽可能减小对社会中各方势力、各个阶层的损害的基础上解决问题。大不了抛开共产党，而是让中国——作为一个由无数个体组成的巨大群落，变成聚焦的对象。希望2047可以成为思想的论坛，而我们可以成为做实事的人，科学地学习各种技能、各种知识，将阅读和写作都发挥到个人的极致。

更新：把原来的「自由派社区」改成了「反共社区」。原因为语义糢糊，有误导性。

還能一起用「書和筆」寫辱包文。

或者一起建造一個習近平雕像。

或者合作搞一個長安街，然後有坦克人和坦克。

想象就覺得很刺激呢！沒準比線下聚會還刺激！

或者乾脆用創造模式搞一個圖書館......

雖然沒有任何意義，但是感覺會很好玩。

今天，我准备去家具店购买家具。买家具是为了装修新房子，装修新房子是因为我刚讨到了老婆。讨老婆可累死我了，原来的婚姻中介都被取消了，说是不能搞包办婚姻这种腐朽落后的东西，家里认识的人又不多，搞得我不知去哪相亲。我当时争辩说婚姻中介不是包办婚姻，结果被两个无产阶级战士一人踹了一脚，还说什么“再复读你那资本主义旧社会的利己主义思想就革你的命！”我吓得屁滚尿流地跑了，半路又不小心摔进了沟里。我寻思这也不行啊，今天也太衰了，于是回家前去共产超市领了一块马克思徽章带回家保平安，又拿了一把香，回家给伟大革命家思想家列宁的神龛供上。兴许真是共产主义的伟大祖师马克思列宁保佑，也可能是我工作单位好，比较抢手，后来家里人真给我介绍了一个小姑娘，是大学生，原来读的是商科，革命成功后课都没了，就转学计算机了。

这个老婆我可喜欢了，长得好看还温文尔雅，我很喜欢她；我是政府公务员，是为人民服务的父母官，她也很喜欢我。所以我们相亲的第一次，我就问她计算机有几种组装法？刚聊了四十分钟我就认定她是我妻子，开始商量以后买什么床。见面四十分钟就开始聊家具购买了，各位！她说最好是八尺大床，我当场就同意了。

我是公务员，肩负重任影响重大，所以要递交结婚申请。申请完刚过一天，就是今天，我俩便手挽手去家具店选家具，都乐呵呵的。革命后，所有的家具店都被合并成了一个大家具店，就是“共产共家”，政府是单一付款人。到了家具店，我就看上了一个非常精致的八尺大床，指着床就要买。“同志！我们要这张床！”售货员听了就向我们走了过来，她说：“同志们买这个床经过国家批准了没有？”我俩当时就愣住了，怎么还要批准呐？不是说各取所需吗？她又说：“这个床是店里最精致的，全省就两张，纯手工打造的，同志，您看这雕花......这个床，负责管理的同志说了，这个床必须谨慎考虑谁能拿到，谁能好好保养，否则是对工匠同志的不尊重，这是人家劳动了三年多的结晶呐。”我一听就不乐意了：“难道我就没资格买了吗？”售货员也变得严肃起来：“同志！所以家具店已经收为国有，现在实行的是共产主义销售制度，怎么会区别对待呢？大家都可以买，都有机会，您怎么能说这是按资格买的呢？不过，您是否能得到批准，不是我们能决定的，您得去物购裁决部申请购买，然后那里的同志做决定。”我听的云里雾里的，就嘀嘀咕咕地说了声“同志我懂了，我先去看别的家具...”然后拉起老婆走了。

我俩买了东西回家时，突然发现隔壁邻居被警察押走了。仔细一打听，呀，原来是个隐藏在广大无产阶级群众中的前资本家！我听了暗暗吃惊，我老婆反应就更激烈了，拿起白纸黑笔就写了一个大字条“在此声明，我家对门的、万恶的、资本主义的、剥削压榨的前资本家和我家没有半点来往”贴在门外，又在门框上面挂上了锤子镰刀的模型。“我现在真后悔以前思想觉悟不高，去学了剥削压榨的方法！”她愤愤不平地说道，“以后我要比别人更努力地划清界限。”

到了晚上，我拿出了这个月的最后两瓶啤酒——因为按需分配，大街上都是醉汉，政府就规定了每人每月能领取的每种酒的数量。我和老婆一人一瓶，喝的还算过瘾。后来警察在对门搜查东西，我俩也出去看，看看这个资棍都有什么家伙什。没想到也没什么特别的，就是有很多书和资料，都是为资本主义服务用的。我俩对视一眼，一齐朝对门邻居的门上啐了口唾沫——“呸！”哼，以前看他总是笑盈盈的，没想到也是个剥削者！回头一看，楼下的邻居也来看热闹了，是个微胖的中年人。他指着那些文件跟我们说：“同志，看见了没？这个资本家临走前还辩护自己没有剥削人，自己一直待人很好，兢兢业业，鬼才信...”我打断她，“世上没有鬼，要用唯物主义看事情。”他一下子严肃起来，赶忙也对着我对门邻居的门啐了一口，“噢！愿马克思原谅我，我不是故意的。”他又补了一句：“只有右派才信。雇佣关系的本质就是剥削，谁信他没有雇佣人就经商呢？”然后我们不说话了，都很沉默，一直看着警察把前资本家的东西都抄走，门也关上，这才各自回家。

入睡前，我还在回味今天看资本家被抓的美事，突然老婆问我要怎么装修房子，我一时语塞。装修房子是个耗钱的活呐，要是想装修的像革命胜利前资本主义社会中富人区的房子一样，那就难了，政府现在对这个卡得很紧，因为大家都选最精甚细腻的装修，搞得物资紧张。我深深后悔自己结婚太晚了，要是早一点的话，没准就能拿到别墅装修的批准了，还要像现在这样挤在国家公寓？不过转念一想，我是政府职员，肯定不被批准别墅装修。想到这我再次感叹新共产党深谋远虑，只允许政府人员居住指定居所，防止走后门搞腐败呐！正想着，警察突然来敲门了，我开了门，却被告知：“同志！您的结婚批准不予通过。”我满腹疑惑，为什么啊？警察同志又开口了：“同志！您是政府公务员，公务员要树立良好的榜样啊！我们伟大的共产主义政府刚刚建立，还没有除尽资本主义利己主义的万恶风气，需要对党员严格要求。您是共产党员，是公务员，不能和从商科毕业的人结婚。”我一听，更糊涂了，拉着她的手就问：“你商科毕业了吗？不是转学吗？”她一下子眼泪出来了，“对不起！同志！对不起，阿明（我的名字）！我之前瞒着你，我没想到我的个人历史会有这么差的影响，会耽误咱俩结婚......”警察同志说：“不止毕业，还实习了一年。”她哭的更大声了。我气急败坏，“操恁娘咧，原来也当过资本家的走狗！老子从此跟你恩断义绝，老死不相往来。”话说得虽然狠，可我感情还在，我真怕她出事，于是煎熬的像热锅上的蚂蚁。后来警察说从宽处理，我只好略微放心，跟着他们去警察局办事了。这一晚就在警察局度过，对口供什么的，一晚上没睡。

半夜时，我睁开眼，发现自己睡在警察局的长椅上，头发乱糟糟的。有一个警察同志告诉我，说她别的没什么事，但是隐瞒历史是罪，要被关一段时间。我迷迷糊糊地听着，又迷迷糊糊的睡去了，又迷迷糊糊地做了一个梦，好象是关于我青年时代的事情，夏天......不知怎么，我咧咧嘴，泪，流了下来。

@沉默的广场 #103784 你的thickness太重了，150%诶，字都没了，除非用习近平亲自设计的能显示200%的HTML

这个可以用来彻底抹除你在2047发的内容，用这个替代原内容即可，如果你不希望原内容能从「源码」里看到的话。

CSS仿製膜乎的「刪貼控評」：

删帖控平

代码：（复制粘贴即可使用）

<span style="color:#999"><span style="color:#999; text-decoration:line-through;text-decoration-thickness:10%;">删帖控平</span></span>

更新：去看了下源码，字体颜色确认无疑是#999，已更正。

经@沉默的广场 启发，发掘了新的玩法：

已脱贫

看三小啦都已经删除了

也可以标志一个「观察」，表示你觉得这个发言文化程度太低，只有小学生这种低端人口才会说，但又没有到需要删除的地步。例如：

中国一不输出革命，二不输出饥饿和贫困，三不去折腾你们，还有什么好说的^观察

<span style="color:#999">中国一不输出革命，二不输出饥饿和贫困，三不去折腾你们，还有什么好说的<sup>观察</sup></span>

仿制萌娘百科的黑色改正带（原class名叫"heimu"，难道应该是叫“黑幕”而不是改正带？算了管他呢）（注意：需要javascript来实现原有的「鼠标移上去就变白色字体、鼠标移走又变回黑色」的功能）：

他当浙江省委书记的时候。过去我也不知道，他的文化程度那么低......只有小学程度！

<span id="coloralter" title="你知道的太多了" style="color:#252525;background-color:#252525;text-shadow:none;transition:color 0.13s;" onmouseover="style.color='white'" onmouseout="style.color='#252525'">他当浙江省委书记的时候。过去我也不知道，他的文化程度那么低......只有小学程度！</span>

有时候我就理解不了，这些问题，动动脑子想想就知道有了民主自由这些都好解决，怎么就那么多人想不明白还前赴后继的给阿共哥哥打call

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Asia Oct 10th 2020 edition

Rousing music accompanies the h-6k, a hulking Chinese bomber, as it sweeps up into a pink sky. Moments later, its pilot presses a red button, with the panache and fortitude that only a People’s Liberation Army (pla) officer could muster, and a missile streaks towards the island of Guam. The ground ripples and a fiery explosion consumes America’s Andersen air force base. Never mind that the pla propaganda film released in September pinches footage from Hollywood blockbusters; the message is that this is what America can expect if it is foolhardy enough to intervene on behalf of Taiwan in a regional war.

China’s Communist Party claims Taiwan, a democratic and prosperous country of 24m people, although the island has not been ruled from the mainland since 1949. A tense peace is maintained as long as Taiwan continues to say that it is part of China, even if not part of the People’s Republic. China once hoped that reunification could be achieved bloodlessly through growing economic and cultural ties. But two-thirds of Taiwanese no longer identify as Chinese, and 60% have an unfavourable view of China. In January Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party was resoundingly re-elected as president over a China-friendly rival.

Last year Xi Jinping, China’s leader, declared unification to be an “inevitable requirement for the historical rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. The pla has stepped up pressure on Taiwan in recent months, sending warplanes across the “median line” that long served as an unofficial maritime boundary and holding large naval drills off several parts of Taiwan’s coast.

Defending Taiwan is growing ever harder. A decade ago China had four times as many warships as Taiwan. Today it has six times as many. It has six times the number of warplanes and eight times as many tanks. China’s defence budget, merely double Taiwan’s at the end of the 1990s, is now 25 times greater (see chart).

American intelligence officials do not think that China is about to unleash this firepower. The pla’s amphibious fleet has grown slowly in recent years. China has never held even a single exercise on the scale that would be required for a d-Day-type campaign. Indeed, no country has assaulted a well-defended shore since America did so in Korea—with good reason.

Although China could wipe out Taiwan’s navy and air force, says William Murray of the us Naval War College, the island would still be able to fire anti-ship missiles at an invading armada, picking out targets with mobile radar units hidden in the mountainous interior. That could make mincemeat of big ships crossing a narrow strait (see map). “The pla can’t use precision weapons to attack small, mobile things,” says Ethan Lee, who as chief of general staff at Taiwan’s defence ministry in 2017-19 developed a strategy for asymmetrical warfare.

Nor can China put all its forces to use. “Only a fraction of the pla could be deployed,” says Dennis Blasko, a former American army attaché in Beijing, “because its overwhelming numbers can’t all fit into the Taiwan front or in the airspace surrounding Taiwan at one time”. Satellite reconnaissance would give Taiwan weeks of warning to harden defences and mobilise reserves. Mr Blasko thinks a nimbler air assault, using helicopters and special forces, is more likely than an amphibious attack. Even then, he says, the island is “very defensible, if it is properly prepared and the people have the will to defend it”.

Alas, Taiwan’s preparedness and its will to fight both look shaky. “The sad truth is that Taiwan’s army has trouble with training across the board,” says Tanner Greer, an analyst who spent nine months studying the island’s defences last year. “I have met artillery observers who have never seen their own mortars fired.” Despite long-standing efforts to make the island indigestible, Taiwan’s armed forces are still overinvested in warplanes and tanks. Many insiders are accordingly pessimistic about its ability to hold out. Mr Greer says that of two dozen conscripts he interviewed, “only one was more confident in Taiwan’s ability to resist China after going through the conscript system.” Less than half of Taiwanese polled in August evinced a willingness to fight if war came.

A vital question is therefore whether Americans would do so, for the sake of a distant country whose defence spending has fallen steadily as a share of gdp over two decades. America does not have a formal alliance with Taiwan. But it sells the island weapons—$13bn-worth over the past four years—and has long implied that it would help repel an invasion if Taiwan had not provoked one. Yet the same trend that imperils Taiwan in the first place—China’s growing military power—also raises the price of American involvement.

In wargames set five or more years in the future, “the United States starts losing people and hardware in the theatre very quickly,” says David Ochmanek of the rand Corporation, a think-tank. “Surface combatants tend to stay far from the fight, forward air bases get heavily attacked and we’re unable to project power sufficiently into the battlespace to defeat the invasion.” America is disadvantaged by geography, with its air force reliant on a handful of Asian bases well within range of Chinese missiles. American bombers can swoop in from the safety of American soil, but there is a shortage of missiles to arm them. Nor is it clear how America’s technology-dependent armed forces would fare against an inevitable physical and electronic barrage on their satellites and computer networks.

In another wargame conducted earlier this year, the Centre for a New American Security (cnas), another think-tank, assumed that Taiwan would fight tenaciously and that America would have access to weapons still under development. Under those rosier circumstances, the island survives—at least after ten notional days of combat—but even then only at huge cost. The seas around Taiwan would look “like no-man’s-land at the Somme”, notes Christopher Dougherty of cnas.

The question is whether America has the stomach for this. The conquest of Taiwan would not just dent American prestige but also expose the outlying islands of Japan, an ally America is pledged to defend. The Trump administration has sent several high-level officials to Taipei to show its support—one reason for the recent Chinese bluster. In Congress support for Taiwan is at “new highs”, says Bonnie Glaser of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (csis), another think-tank.

Polls by csis show that Americans broadly support coming to Taiwan’s aid, roughly as much as they support helping South Korea, Japan or Australia. Such enthusiasm may wane, however, if American ships start getting sunk in large numbers. American losses in the cnas wargame amount to a hundred or so aircraft, dozens of ships and perhaps a couple of carriers. “An aircraft-carrier has 5,000 people on it,” says Mr Murray. “That’s 100 voters in every state of our union. That’s a lot of funerals.”

Fear of such losses might deter an American president from entering the fray. But incurring them might stiffen American resolve. America and its partners can use this dynamic to their advantage, says Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon official. If American troops were to disperse in allied countries like Japan and draw on allied support to repel a Chinese attack, China would have to choose between striking a wide range of targets beyond Taiwan, and outraging American and Asian public opinion, or sacrificing military advantage.

Escalation might go even further. The fact that Chinese nuclear missiles can now reach any American city raises the stakes dramatically. “When the bullets really start flying,” says Michael Hunzeker of George Mason University, “the American people, most of whom can’t find Taiwan on a map, will be hard-pressed to say, ‘No, I’m really willing to trade Los Angeles for Taipei.’”

Taiwanese officials acknowledge these grim trends. Even if America is willing to come to Taiwan’s aid, that is no use if it is not capable of doing so, Su Chi, a former secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, has argued. But the logical response, transforming Taiwan’s own defences, is hard when only a fifth of people think war will come. In the sleepy fishing village of Zhuwei, on the north-west coast, an area thought to be a prime landing site for the pla, tourists eat stir-fried seafood in restaurants as multicoloured fishing vessels bob in the harbour. “The Chinese won’t invade,” says Lin Fu-fun, an airport safety inspector who has come to watch the waves splash on a jagged breakwater. “Our language and culture are the same.” ■

前段時間我還在爲泰國感到微小的希望，沒想到進展的這麼快

我最近在想，是不是應該像民國時期一樣保留部分文言文的語法？雖然我也不很瞭解文言文，但是現在大陸的論壇，可以看到在進行邏輯溝通時，用今天這個被極端白話的語言系統交流有多費力。很多東西都要用一大堆字才能說明白，純白話文太冗長了

蘸酱太麻烦了，所以我从来就不蘸了睡大觉。