邓矮子 @邓矮子
16

这次大选,足以看到很多人把中式集权思维模式的东西带入了美国大选,同时进行了美国在地化,加入了传统美国红脖子的阴谋论,成为了新时代特色川普脑残粉。

通过一些正常逻辑思维都能判断的常识,居然在脑残粉圈里传播的非常广泛,这世界有什么不正常吗?从病毒是假的,到地球的平的,思维没有任何进步,建议脑残粉要发挥出少数民族的优势,多主动制造阴谋论而不是抄袭翻译,要成为Q的主要内容提供者。

即使在美国生活了这么多年,依然能看到这些脑残粉大叫,清算反对派,钉在历史的耻辱柱上面,丝毫没有被美国的正常社会影响,我微信朋友圈里面经常见到这种人,教会里面的叔叔阿姨尤其多

另外思维没有脱离人情社会,不理解新大陆上面的法治思维,依然再用欧亚大陆的人情社会思考问题,川普任命的人就一定要帮他,对军队好军队就一定要帮助川普,这都是什么和什么啊

还有什么什么套用国共内战的历史,美国两党根本不是两个苏共体制起家的政党的运营模式,没有大清洗,更没有要你死我活的武装夺权,在法律下妥协才是美式民主的主流

12

那么这就是个人崇拜裹挟这民粹对司法的摧毁,美国为什么是美国,是因为程序正义,最高法院终身制就是用来保持关键的理性的,必须保证法官不能被巨大的民意一起煽动起来左右。

之前的例子我们见多了,随便定义一个“共匪”然后把他直接送进关塔那摩严刑拷打,刑讯逼供,然后坐电椅???如果这就是你梦想的社会,那么法制世界不适合你,在法制世界,麦卡锡这种行为都是绝对的违被常识,你们要干什么。

法国大革命为什么被诟病,就是因为民粹裹挟政府进行疯狂行为,而美国为什么建国以来民粹没有成功,就是因为有绝对理性的高院机制。

因为在法院没占到优势,就到处大叫美国司法已废,推翻程序正义才能保证正义,这个川粉的这个说辞实在无法认同,川普和他带领的川粉也是收到美国程序正义保护的一份子,如果没有了程序正义,川普今天别说上诉,直接进监狱都有可能

9

拜登已经稳赢了,但是在这个时候,我希望各位不要对川粉落井下石,该结束最终会结束,互相尊重的方式结束这次选举,这个时候千万不要把清算思维用在政见不合的人身上,我不喜欢川普内阁的很多政策,也希望川普内阁下台,但是今天更多的是尊重川普内阁4年的任期,承认他们作为美国内阁的功劳

8

欧洲人普遍认为法国是罗马帝国文明的正统继承人。德国也拥有同样的思维。 在法西斯第三帝国时代, 德国厌恶古罗马,因为德国认为,法国和罗马已经是同义词了,法国文化就是古罗马的拉丁文化。因为德国第三帝国讨厌法国,所以德国也自然也讨厌古罗马。在德国,法国文化也被认为是罗马文化。德国把法国文学和法语, 常年归为是罗马体系的文学和语言。第三帝国时期, 德国欣赏欧洲古文明,但是和罗马保持距离,因为德国人认为法国是罗马的继承人。 结果德国第三帝国企图模仿古希腊。

德国第三帝国喜欢古文明。 既然要和罗马保持距离, 因此德国就开始了对古希腊的崇拜和模仿。第三帝国的一些人绞尽脑汁, 企图把古希腊的文化辉煌和德意志人联系起来。 说古希腊人有德意志血统。等等。法西斯战后准备建立的德国帝国,是完全建立在古希腊风格上的。尤其是城市建设。法西斯企图建立的德国帝国, 其实是在复兴其他民族的文化。 而不是在推崇自己民族的文化。

德国第三帝国的人, 认为推崇德意志传统文化很丢人。因为几千年前,德意志地区的外族人生活野蛮落后, 穿动物皮, 留长发,吃糟糕的肉和奶 ,好打斗, 但是不喜欢工作, 没有高度文明的发展比如货币和写字, 没有高级的武器, 等等。加上中世纪上百年, 德国地区没有太大的发展, 就更尴尬了。如果推销德意志文化, 就显得德国地区比地中海地区落后很多。欧洲人认为, 继承了罗马拉丁体系的民族性格激烈, 情绪不稳 , 好战, 勇猛, 荣耀感强。在欧洲, 好战这个名誉不是绝对的褒义词, 有时候甚至会成为贬义词。因为好战有时候是情绪不稳定, 火气大, 不理智的反映。在欧洲上百年来, 法国民族总是被认为是一个好战的民族。 这个头衔并不是绝对褒义的。如果说某个民族是好战的话, 那么最好的例子就是法国--------克劳塞维茨。德国人认为,古希腊文化辉煌, 是因为他们用大理石做东西, 大理石能经得住岁月,可以被保留下来。而德意志人喜欢用木头做东西, 木头经不起岁月, 容易烂掉。

法国人好战, 好斗的名誉, 在很多历史事件和文学作品里都有反映。 被很多人看做是贬义特征。英国人认为, 有拉丁血统的人好斗,冲动,情绪不稳定。法国人被认为是罗马帝国的后代, 是一个正统的拉丁民族,所以继承了了拉丁人的好斗特征。在“尼罗河的惨案”文学作品里, 凶手Jacqueline 因为拥有一半法国血统,她的冲动, 好斗特征,被很多英国人看做是她的拉丁血统的反映。 这些旁观者认为 Jacqueline 的性格是天生注定的, 因为她有法国血统, 所以肯定好斗, 性格激烈。大家总是说,这位法国混血女性情绪激烈, 是因为the Latin in her.普法战争前, 一些德国人非常明白法国人好斗的特征。 所以俾斯麦才如此自信的制造了埃姆斯电报事件。因为俾斯麦了解法国人的好斗, 他知道, 去招惹法国人, 激怒法国人, 是让他们中计最好的手段。法国人绝对不会接受这个来自普鲁士的侮辱,按兵不动。在法国做过外交官俾斯麦,太了解法国人了。法国人火爆好斗的名誉,俾斯麦是了解的。

从历史上看,西班牙跟意大利这些拉丁民族也很好战,好征服,古罗马的版图跟十六世纪的西国的美洲殖民都是显见的,只是这两国衰弱的早,在距离现代的两百年內西方人已经对这两国的好侵略没有深刻的印象。

英国人说起法国人好斗的性格时, 通常是带着讽刺口吻的,因为英国人喜欢性格稳重的人, 喜欢压制情感, 不喜欢表达情感。所以他们通常认为, 好斗,好战, 性格激烈的民族特征, 是一种缺陷。在唐顿庄园里, 这种思维经常被表现出来。比如老爷认为:一个英国人对家人的感情都不容易表现出来。德国第二帝国时期, 刚刚经历了建国的德国人性格也变得不稳定, 情绪激烈。在当时的英国旁观者眼里, 也是一种极大的缺陷。相对的话,英国人不善于表达自己的情感, 害怕出丑,而德国人喜欢大声地表达情感。丝毫不受任何顾虑所控制, 喜欢摇旗呐喊, 高呼万岁. 没有顾虑的释放情感, 丝毫没有任何保留.-----------------------------普鲁士路易斯公主的英国家庭教师, Topham

希特勒其实也崇拜罗马。 他认为, 德意志人在和罗马拉丁文化接触前, 是一个落后无能的民族。希特勒不认为阿米尼乌斯是德意志的民族英雄, 他认为阿米尼乌斯是罗马的徒弟。因为他和罗马文化的接触,才让他变成了战斗英雄。希特勒还说, 如果罗马人没有征用德意志人做士兵, 那么德意志人永远不会成为士兵。希特勒认为, 德意志民族常年落后, 是因为天气地理恶劣的缘故, 只有在地中海的温暖下 (和古希腊和罗马的接触), 德意志人才能发挥出最好的本领。

很多现代人在崇拜德国的时候, 经常无视意大利,意大利成为了皮具的代名词,但是这些人可能不能想象, 希特勒不但是墨索里尼的崇拜者,更意大利的崇拜者。希特勒不仅仅在意大利面前有自卑心理, 他在墨索里尼面前也有自卑心理。在意大利历史的面前, 希特勒觉得抬不起头来。尽管德国近现代历史上更对古希腊感兴趣 (因为在德国人眼里,罗马和法国有很大的联系),但是希特勒作为生活在南部的奥地利人, 对意大利和古罗马的兴趣更大。希特勒本人是一个痴迷的古罗马崇拜者。一旦德国和意大利比起来, 希特勒就觉得话题敏感, 产生自卑思维。不仅仅是因为意大利地区历史上辉煌的文化成就,而且也是因为墨索里尼在1922年就已经得势,而希特勒在1923年却受挫。

和很多德国人一样, 希特勒觉得德国古代历史让他自卑。他非常歧视德国古代历史, 因为它缺乏艺术, 缺乏文化, 缺乏高度文明。和古罗马和古希腊相比, 德国地区的古代历史让希特勒抬不起头来。希特勒和希姆莱的态度不同。 希姆莱崇拜德国地区的历史,因为希姆莱过于崇拜德国地区的历史, 希特勒甚至因此批评了他!希特勒不赞同在德国进行考古学, 因为在德国考古只能证明德国古代的落后。希特勒想尽法子都要让德意志人和古希腊罗马人联系起来。很多人吐槽意大利, 瞧不起意大利的文化遗址, 但是希特勒是第三帝国最重视文化艺术的人,他一个巨大的野心, 就是让德国城市抛头换面, 改造成古希腊罗马的风格,给后代留下永垂不朽的文化遗址。

党卫军和希特勒的想法不同。 党卫军企图复兴德国传统文化,但是希特勒非常不赞同这点。 因为希特勒瞧不起德国地区的古代文化。认为它们和古希腊古罗马文化没法比。希特勒是一个古文化崇拜者。 后来德国和希腊开战, 让他非常痛苦。希特勒的讲话, 平时的谈话和文字记录, 都充满了大量从古罗马历史里学来的东西。后来希特勒要求, 连德国的很多文件都必须用拉丁antiqua 字体来写。希特勒年轻的时候, 特别想去意大利看看, 可惜没钱。后来, 希特勒说起他想去看雅典卫城的愿望。希特勒去了一次巴黎, 说, 他只记住了凯旋门。 因为那是古罗马风格的。后来他要在德国建立一个比巴黎的凯旋门还要高大的凯旋门。

希特勒是一个重视文化体现, 重视面子工程的人。他总是想要在德国建立一些古希腊罗马风格的建筑。他要在柏林建一条世界最长最宽的马路。 在另一个城市建立最大的体育馆。为什么呢? 希特勒说, 我要让每个德国人恢复自尊心。希特勒要建一个比拿破仑的凯旋门还要高大的凯旋门。希特勒计划中的凯旋门比法国的高2倍,这个凯旋门希特勒的一个重要计划。

德国人在近现代历史上, 更崇拜古希腊。因为古罗马和法国被联系在了一起。歌德,席勒这些德国文豪都是古希腊的崇拜者。后来, 在拿破仑一世的时期, 德国人把法国第一帝国看做了新的罗马。德国人觉得拿破仑是一个古罗马风格的皇帝。 德意志人认为, 拿破仑的思维和艺术品位都是古罗马的,对抗拿破仑, 也是在对抗古罗马文化。因此, 不少德国人对古罗马的态度就更不好了。

德国人对罗马的另一个负面态度, 是因为他们的德国同胞马丁路德曾经和罗马教会发生了冲突。罗马这个词, 也让德国人想到了腐败的教会。自从18世纪, 德国文化就更喜欢古希腊文化研究, 研究古罗马文化的责任被推给了法国人。在古希腊人那里, 德国人找到了组织, 找到了民族身份。和古希腊人做联系, 德国也许会成为“罗马风格的法国” 的反义词。这也符合当年德国人的仇恨法国情绪。在早年的德国地区, 拉丁语让德国人普遍联想到法国,拿破仑, 古罗马凯撒, 和教皇。在绝大的德国人眼里, 这些都是负面的内容。

当希特勒要求德国的文件必须用拉丁antiqua 字体来写, 很多尊重德国文化的德意志人都气坏了。就连希特勒喜欢的 “日耳曼尼亚" 这个词, 都不是德语, 而是拉丁文。希特勒不建议在德国进行考古研究, 因为每件文物, 都只能证明德国古代的落后。希特勒说, “那些古罗马人认为被送往日耳曼尼亚, 是一种惩罚,就好比德国人被送往落后的波森时候的感受”。他还说 “我们根本没有辉煌的过去,为什么还要考古呢? 当罗马人在建造雄伟壮观的建筑时,我们还住在棚屋里。 人家古希腊古罗马人达到高度文明的时候, 我们还在外面烤火取暖。这已经够丢人了, 希姆莱居然还想考古!我们应该对我们的过去只字不提, 但是希姆莱非要在考古上折腾!“

第三帝国那种军国主义思维, 不崇拜罗马是不可能的 , 只不过罗马和法国联系起来了, 他们才成了酸葡萄思维。 否则为什么抄袭罗马军礼?

8

首先民主国家的难民政策的前提是,认为我的国家,有义务,有责任,接受难民,是国家层面上的接收难民,而不是我私人接受难民,我自然没有义务把私人财产提供给国家的政策,除非国家要公款把我的房子买下来,但是这样,我家就变成了政府财产了

第二,我是合法的交税公民,政府用我的税收给难民提供房子,这是税务法律,如果我再把我自己的家里免费提供给难民住,这是慈善,慈善是自愿的,税收是必须的,既然税交了,那就没有多余的责任了,换句话说,我已经把我通过税收给难民提供了房屋,为什么说我还需要在多余的把自己家给难民住呢,因为难民已经住在了我的税金的屋子里,慈善我不做请问有什么问题呢

7

I learned one truth in my travels. This state has two spiritual foundations. The call to prayer that Mehmed the Conqueror had sung from the minarets of Hagia Sophia? It is still sung! The Qur'an thatSelim had read in the Pavilion of the Mantle of the Prophet? It is still read!

Selective remembrance of the past was vital for the newly established Turkish republic. As a newly established state, the Turkish government needed to create an identity juxtaposed to the established identities that were rampant during the Ottoman Era, with the Ottoman-Islamic identity being the most prominent. However, the new state was established on the principles of nationalism, rationalism, and secularism. Thus, the Turkish government could not utilize the previously widespread Islamic identity, nor can it embody the identity of its former ruler, the Ottoman. Therefore, the state began to invest its efforts in establishing a nationalistic Turkish identity that was fundamentally devoid of both Ottoman and Islamic influence and necessity. This project largely began in the 1930’s, almost a decade after the establishment of the Republic. It encompassed the name of different facets including a shift to the Latin alphabet re-education. For the purpose of this paper, the Turkish National Thesis was by far the most influential. In an effort to rewrite history, the Turkish government financed a “new” view which proposed that the Turkish people had a long history before the advent of Islam and the Ottoman empire, which in turn produced a great Turkish civilization that lefts its mark upon most civilization afterwards. This new historiographical world-view that re-enforced the proposed nationalistic Turkish identity was instilled in altering the landscape of Istanbul, the previous Ottoman capital. The Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi were two key monuments that captured the essence of Ottoman-Islamic rule and thus. The Turkish government needed to either destroy these monuments or reinvent them to fit into their newly proposed identity. The latter was chosen, and through altering and selectively remembering the past, were able to secularize and transform them into museums that highlighted the triumphs of the new republic at the expense of the old Ottoman regime.

Historicizing the period

The time period that this paper will focus on cover spans from the beginning of the Republic in the 1920’s to the 1930’s. This block of time depicts the struggle that the Kemalist government faced as they attempted to consolidate power and rework the new Turkish State under the heavy hand and vision of its leader, Mustafa Kemal “Ataturk” (1881-1938). Soner Cagaptay has characterized 1920s and the 1930’s, into two distinct time periods each with their own specific and unique characteristics. For Cagaptay, the 1920’s was an era wherein Turkey was recovering from the devastation, both material and demographic, brought on by the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the First World War, and the Greco-Turkish War of 1920-22. Thus, Cagaptay characterizes this period as “a period of physical and political re-structuring when Ataturk had focused his energy on establishing a secular republic”.

The clearest example of the political re-structuring was the struggle between the nationalists (the Ankara Circle) and the Istanbul Circle, the latter, defined by Ozoglu as those who did not support the Ankara movement, in particular, the royalists. This struggle is highlighted with the “Incident of 150ers” (Yuzellilikler Olayi) wherein the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) included a causes that stipulated that while there was to be a general amnesty towards those who were cooperating with the enemy (against the new Turkish Republic), the Turks had a right to name 150 people of Muslim origin that would be excluded from the general amnesty. This comprehensive lists provides a good indicator of the people and factions that made the Ankara Circle nervous and they included: Vahdettin’s circle who were not members of the dynasty, Ottoman Cabinet members who assumed responsibility for the anti-Ankara caliphal army, those who signed the Treaty of Sevres, members of the Caliphal Army, Ethem “the Circassian” and his associates, Delegates in the Circassian Congress, police officer who cooperated with the occupying forces, and journalists who were in opposition to the Ankara Circle. Thus, what is interesting about this list is the decision to exclude the Kurds, even though the Kemalists were aware of Kurdish nationalism and their potential threat (which was shown in the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion). However, rather than expelling Kurdish leaders, the Ankara Circle decided to include a large Circassian group, a number of which were inconsequential Circassian nationalists. Ozoglu argues that this is because the Circassians were traditionally close to the Ottoman rule and royalty and therefore, the Ankara Circle was worried that they would ally themselves with the foreign powers. Therefore, this period can be defined as a period of political re-structuring especially to uproot the previous Ottoman dynasty, as Ataturk believed that “as long as the Ottoman dynasty resided in Turkey, the opponents of Ankara would be encouraged.” The beginning of the1930’s marked a break from 1920’s in terms of its priorities and focuses. In the 1930’s, the Republic was more firmly established and the country had ben rebuilt and thus, the state was able to shift from the previous priority of consolidating its rule and stamping out the supporters of the previous Ottoman dynasty to ideology and state building. The ideologies that the state would focus on were outlined in a speech given by Ataturk on September 24, 1931 where he declared that the main principles of Kemalism was republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and reformism.

However, it is important to note that this teleological periodization of time as distinct periods, each with its unique characteristics, has its faults and is utilized in an effort to show the shifts within government policy in a way that is more approachable and simplistic. The government did indeed feel more confident in the 1930’s than in the previous era and therefore was able to move ahead with its nationalistic plans; however, to say it began in 1930 would oversimplify reality. Furthermore, even in the 1930’s, government policy was in no way clear-cut and there were still debates on a number of different issues. One example would be on the membership of ethnic minorities in the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Although by law, CHP membership was to be open only to ethnic Turks and closed to non-Turks, on May 5, 1933, there was still confusion on this issue and is exemplified by the need for a memorandum addressing this. This shows that the local branches of the CHP still were trying to decide whether or not the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Jews were Turks and thereby displaying a lack of cohesion and confusion between theory and practice. This is also true with secularism and the idea that after the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 and the subsequent shifts in other religious policies in the 1920s did not create a secular state in the 1930’s. The state had become more secular but there was a gap between theory and practice and therefore caution is necessary when using terms such as, “by the beginning of the 1930’s, when a secular republic (My italics) had been firmly established….”

The policies and goals of the aforementioned eras align with the decision for the museumifcation of the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi. The attempt to uproot and supplant the old Ottoman dynasty and its representations in the 1920’s would be a reason for the secularization and repossession of both the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi, two Ottoman monuments that dominated the skyline of Istanbul. Furthermore, it was during the 1930’s wherein the Kemalists were able to begin to write a nationalist discourse, ie the Turkish National Thesis, that would influence and direct the secularization of the aforementioned monuments and Turkish architectural style.

Turkish National Thesis

Turkey was one of the few non-European states that never succumbed to colonial suzerainty and therefore, the construction of a collective Turkish identity was facilitated by the resistance against colonialism. Rather than attempting to write an original, source based history, the authors of this “new” Turkish history used already established “facts” that were utilized by the West in their narratives, to produced their own Turkish history that would supplant and expose the falsities of the teleological narcissistic history of the West and show how the “facts” used by them actually showed the greatness of the Turkic people. These “facts” were grounded in the sciences, such as geology, archaeology, and linguists and thus were seen as “neutral” and therefore, if correctly used, could be recycled to create a new master history for the Turkish people. Thus, the Turkish National Thesis attempted to uncover and rediscover the “genius and character of Turks, showing Turks their own specialties and strength” and showing the civilizational capabilities of the Turks. It argued that the Turks had always been civilized and that the ancient Turks, who had civilized Central Asia, had brought the light of civilization to places such as China, India, Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley, Anatolia, and the Aegean. The Turks migrated places where they claim that the “true natives had no civilization”. Thus, the notion that the Turkish people are the truth light of the world and that they bring civilization with them, and a counter to the Hegalian conception of history which argued, how like the sun moves from East to West, so does civilization, which moved from China, to India, to the Middle East until finally resting on Europe. Rather, the Turks were the true founders of Western civilization for they brought the light of civilization to the Sumar, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans and that this can be proven through linguistics and thus, rationale science. The languages of the Sumerians, Etruscans, and Hittite, all of which were potentially proto-Indo-European languages, fall under the linguistic category of Turkish. This attempt to draw a connection linguistically to the early and Western civilizations also appears in the racial claims, also based on scientific reason, that the Turks were in fact a white and brachycephalic race. Rather than to be placed in the category of yellow races, which were considered by Europeans as secondary people, the Turkish National Thesis argued that even though they originated from Central Asia, the Turks were, in reality, belonging to the White race.

The Turkish National Thesis was the project of the Turkish Historical Commission, which was established on April 23, 1930 and in that year published A General outline of Turkish History, which was written under the guidance of Ataturk himself. The following year (1931), a four-volume set of high school history textbooks was published and between the years of 1933-1936, sixty-six follow up projects were produced. The purpose of the Turkish National Thesis was (1) to secularize Turkish history and also the historical worldview through science and reason; (2) to remove the Eurocentric perception of world history and thus, turning the focus of history eastwards rather than westwards; (3) to expose the archaism of the Ottoman past as backwards and irrational with its use of religion; (4) to show that Turkish history had a glorious past prior to the rise of the Ottomans and Islam. Therefore, the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi, both of which were beacons of the Ottoman past, were to be supplanted and this was done in conjuncture to the Historical National Thesis. The Ottoman monuments were a symbol of the archaistic Ottoman rule and with the rise of the Historical National Thesis, the need to hark back to the Ottoman past was no longer necessary, rather, the State could first downplay and discredit the Ottoman past, and through new architectural forms, accentuate the glories of the Turkic past, thereby strengthening the new states claim to the Anatolian heartland through a new nationalists identity.

Methodology and theories

Foucault asserts that knowledge and power and intertwined with one another and that the more complex power structures become, the knowledge that they produce allows for the existence of Modernity. Therefore, as power increase, it allows for the creation of specific knowledge and vice-versa. Furthermore, the concept of governmentality also plays a role in knowledge production and thus, shape identity and knowledge. The knowledge that is produced by government institutions (Universities, organizations, NGO’s) all shape the way that we view the world and through organized practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) enable the governance of a people. This paper will use the theories of Foucault as mentioned above, which in turn shaped theories in Archeology in an attempt to provide new insight into the way in which the creation of museums shape identity and nationalism. Archeology, like museums, is a discipline that is highly susceptible to political influences and pressures for the needs of the state and thus uses the “past” in order to justify their authority and rule. States need to create and ensure that its citizens possess a “consciousness of togetherness” and this is especially true for states that have a multi-ethnic characteristic or they risk a social and cultural disintegration. Therefore a shared language and/or shared past and future allow for the impression or feeling of unity, belongingness, and culture which can be created through history or archeology, and in this case, museums. Thus is created a paradigm of an “us” who have a shared present and future and those who are do not, the “other”. This shared present and future also requires a shared past which creates a shared memory, yet the past, in which ever form it is manifested in, such as archeological sites, or museums, need to be contextualized and interpreted and even though archeology is indeed a scientific discipline, the past is shaped by the manipulation and interests of agents who want to create pasts that fit the interests of the present. There political manipulation is fundamentally inherent in archeology because tangible pasts have no voice of their own and because “material objects can move easily from the physical to the symbolical realm.” The voice that is created for these material objects might not have been anticipated by the original makers or the archeologist yet is placed on the object in an effort to politicalize it. The object may seem to be stable and supported but is in fact dynamic and is constantly molded by the pressures exerted externally by social discourse. In Turkey, during the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish republic, archeological practices and the founding of museums were seen as a “barometer of the successful Westernization projects” and therefore, are shaped by social discourse.

Another theory that is applicable to this paper is the application of Edward Said’s concept of the “other”. This other was necessary within Turkish Modernity in order to show the progress of the Republic in contrast to showing the irrationality, weakness, and barbarity of the Ottoman Empire or “the other”. In other words, the “other” was everything that was wrong and that it was the obstacle towards modernity and the country. It was what allowed the Turkish people to fall behind. These theories can explain the motives behind the Republic’s decision to secularize both the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi and their subsequent museumification.

Hagia Sophia

The Hagia Sophia, also known as the Aya Sophia, was the central mosque of the Ottoman sultan since its capture in 1453 until 1932 when it was made into a museum. The Hagia Sophia was the first Imperial Mosque of the Ottoman Empire and was attended by the Sultan on the Jumu'ah. The questions that need to be asked are: How was it possible to secularize and musuemify a Muslim monument? Why was the Hagia Sophia chosen? What was the motive behind it? And what was the process and methods employed to secularize and museumification the Hagia Sophia?

As shown in the previous section, by the 1930’s, the State was much more firmly in power and the Turkish opponents to the state had been largely repressed. Furthermore, in the 1930’s, the government had begun a campaign to construct a new Turkish nationalistic discourse in order to supplant the previous multi-ethnic, ottoman, Islamic identity. Therefore, it was in the 1930’s that Ataturk felt he could transform the Hagia Sophia from a monument of the Islamic Ottoman Empire into a secular Museum and use it to strengthen his own nationalistic discourse and construction. This is concurrent with the argument that Ankara also did not feel confident enough to abolish both the Sultanate and the Caliphate with the same stroke. The abolishment of the Caliphate has been seen by some scholars as not necessarily a move to abolish the office of the Caliphate but to remove the dynasty and its threat. Yet, Ataturk was cautious then and similarly, was cautious and waited for a motive to secularize and museumification the Hagia Sophia.

The decision to make the Hagia Sophia into a museum rather than a number of other Ottoman mosques is based on its previous history prior to the Ottomans. With the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Sultan himself decided to transform the symbol of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Constantinople, and Imperial Byzantine rule, into a mosque and thereby using this monument to strengthen the Sultan’s rule, legitimacy, and power. However, for Ataturk and the new state, this once Christian Church turned Imperial Mosque became a symbol of the past sultanate and as a monument that dominated the skyline, would remind the citizens of Istanbul of the glories and might of the recently disposed Ottoman sultanate and caliphate. Thus, in order to thwart its potential dangers, Ataturk re-appropriated the Hagia Sophia and by transforming it into a museum, would expose its Christian elements, along side its Islamic additions through secularization, and commodification. This falls inline with the theories put forth by archeologists that changing previous interpretations of existing material evidence, such as any Ottoman Mosque’s, is difficult because they are anchored in the material and thereby participants “can point to material evidence to support his or her claims”. However, by exposing its Christian past, the state weakens the Ottomans identity on the monument and the “consciousness of togetherness” that the Ottomans had created and thereby re-appropriating the past.

The re-appropriation of its past was not only to allow for it secularization and commodification but also to strengthen the paradigm put forth by the Turkish Historical Thesis. As mentioned before, one of the goals of the Turkish Historical Thesis was to create a history for the Turks prior to and that excluded the Ottomans. The Ottomans were the “other” like the Orient was the “other” for the Occident. Turkish modernity was pegged on viewing and portraying the Ottomans as something negative and backwards and therefore, the nationalistic Turkish state needed to rewrite history and create a proud and glories Turkish past that superseded the Ottomans. By weakening the Ottomans hold on such a dominating and powerful monument would strengthen the goals of the Turkish Historical Thesis. Furthermore, the move to secularize and transform the Hagia Sophia into a museum would also eliminate its Islamic identity, an identity that the new state wanted to supplant with a secular Turkish nationalistic identity, all the while increasing its tourism value by catering it towards a Christian audience who could visit it in either or both a religious or secular attitude. The Hagia Sophia would have its solely Ottoman past surplanted and the new state would rediscover the Christian elements that were hidden within the Imperial Mosque. By secularizing the museum and allowing archeologists to uncover the hidden past, for the old Christian mosaics had been plastered over by the Ottomans, the State was staying true to its dogma by modernizing in the sense that it was utilizing science, for archeology was a western scientific discipline, to uncover the Hagia Sophia’s hidden past.

Thomas Whittemore (1871-1950), who was the founder of the Byzantine Institute of America, began uncovering the mosaics in the Hagia Sophia in 1931 and due to his successes, continued well after the Hagia Sophia was opened as a museum in 1935. His uncovering of the mosaics was seen as discovering of a masterpiece for the mosaics of the Hagia Sophia was seen, by its Western Audience, as comparable to the Elgin marbles in the British Museum, for the mosaics in question were a masterpiece of Byzantine art. However, prior to the efforts of Whittemore, the mosaics were only a concept through the descriptions of medieval works rather than a reality. His efforts, and those of his wealthy patrons, were only one manifestation of Western interests in the Hagia Sophia as an expression of Byzantine creativity, art work, and monument. And thus, the decision by the state to allow Whittemore to peel off the plaster that covered the only example of mosaic artwork during the period of Justinian, and the subsequent secularization and establishing the Hagia Sophia as a museum was partly fueled by Western enthusiasm and interest. However, the Hagia Sophia, as a public monument, was affected by its commercialization through the “occupation” of itself as it served not only politics as well as tourism and imagination. Nelson demonstrates that as more Europeans and Americans tourists visited the Hagia Sophia, its immediate surroundings began to transform to make the site look more like the one Western pictures had prepared visitors to see. The Hagia Sophia was transformed from a “living building,” that as both a church and a mosque was “vital and socially significant” to a “modern monument,” that was “frozen in some past age, vaguely Byzantine”.

The Hagia Sophia that was once the center of the Byzantine Empire was transformed, outside the realm that its creator envisioned it, into an imperial mosque, as a symbol of Ottoman power and virility, and was once again repurposed into a museum to serve the discourse of the new Turkish Republic. As the new republic began to stabilize and commenced its efforts to write a new nationalistic discourses in an effort to create a unified Turkish identity, the Hagia Sophia, a monument of the past grander, was utilized as both an exponent of a new future (one that is secular, based on reason and science) and to expose and rewrite its ottoman past. As a voiceless monument, the Turkish state was able to empower it as a symbol of a new beginning. As a secular museum, no longer did religion have a hold on the Hagia Sophia other than in history, for it became frozen in time. Therefore it became malleable to serve the Turkish Historical Thesis as a remembrance of the former might of the Ottoman Empire but only as a museum, a monument of the old, that would eventually be shaped and warped by the outside pressures of commercialization and the West.

Topkapi Sarayi

The Topkapi Sarayi was the primary residence of the Ottoman sultans for approximately 400 years (1465–1856) of their 624-year reign and in 1924, it lawfully went from a monument that represented the Empire to one that represented the Nation. It was only until 1927 that it was open to the public but mostly the palace remained closed until after renovations undertaken between 1939 and 1942. Unlike the Hagia Sophia, which was still used as a mosque for believers, the palace was in disuse, with only elderly serving staff, the surviving eunuchs, and dwarves as its remaining residents. The fact that it was largely abandoned was one of the main reasons that the state felt confident enough to reclaim and transform the palace into a museum soon after the disbanding of the Caliphate. The process of preparing the palace for museumhood provides insight into the goals the new Republic had for the museum because it had to be contextualized and interpreted.

Sedad Hakki Eldem (1908-88), one of the Republic's architects, described the palace as “a place full of valuable treasures piled on top of one another, fabrics sometimes in rags and sometimes echoing their former resplendence” and that “most of these places that I mention have been cleaned, that is destroyed, and the essential cut-stone foundations and arches brought out”. Eldem was told, in 1937, to take photos, especially the crumbling parts of the palace, for a glimpse of the palace “before” the restorations. This act of taking “before” photos is highly significant within the discourses that the State was propagating for it has two implication: (a) it strengthened this idea of the Ottomans as the “other”, and (b) it showed the strength of the new state and how it was them that restored such an important Turkish monument back to its former splendor and redeeming it from being “stuck on during the period of decline." Both points strengthen the notion of the new Turkish nationalist identity, and how the new state has once again brought glory and power back to the Turkish people.

The Topkapi Sarayi also fell victim to selective remembrance; for as stated above, the elimination of the previous past and its association with politics is a part of constructing a useable past. For the Topkapi Sarayi, only certain elements were utilized in order to show a specific past by freezing it in time and thereby creating a relatively anachronistic and static view of the palace. The Tiled Pavilion was one section that received this treatment. It was constructed during the reign of Mehmed II, which utilized an International Timurid style that incorporated Central Asian influenced bricks, Persian façade and tiles, and a Revivalist Gothic elements. The uses of this style were to convey the Universalist quality of Mehmed II’s world empire. However, the museum totally leaves out this narrative and visual history by having the building used as a separate museum of ceramics. Furthermore, many of the later, most humble rooms are closed off, the Treasury Pavilion was not restored to its former past but rather its walls were left whitewashed, and in some parts of the palace, the decorations had simply been stripped such as the case of the kitchen. The meaning behind these decisions are undocumented but work together to portray the Topkapi Sarayi as a monument that once been the site of aristocratic opulence at the expense of the commoners (due to the plainness of the kitchen), and hid the universalist motifs that were utilized by Mehmed II that went counter to the nationalistic Turkish rhetoric’s of the State.

With much of the palace was in a state of decay and it would be logical to assume that the pavilion that was in the best state of preservation would be the first one to be put on display. This was not the case, for the Pavilion of the Holy Mantle of the Prophet Muhammad was not open to the public until 1962, a number of years after the restoration of the rest of the palace had been completed. This, I would argue, was due to the fact that the state wanted to remove the previous Islamic identity that was the cornerstone of the Ottomans and replace it with a secular, Turkish one. Further, the Pavilion of the Holy Mantle housed some of the most sacred relics of Islam and could thus be used as a rally for those who preferred an Islamic identity and would also strengthen the recently ousted Caliph and provide material support for his supports. In order to placate them, the pavilion remained closed.Thus, the Topkapi Sarayi is an excellent example of how monuments can be used politically to strengthen the chosen discourse of the holders of power at a given moment.

The two other Imperial residences of the Ottoman Royalty, however, fared differently. The Yildiz and the Dolmabahce Palaces were both of more recent construction, meaning it utilized a more modern, western style of architecture and thus, felt no pressing need to transform them into museums in order to control and own the past. The Yildiz Palace was used as a luxury casino before being converted into a guesthouse for visiting heads of state and royalty. The Dolmabahce Place, on the other hand, was transferred to the government in 1924 and was used by Ataturk as a presidential residence during the summers. This is because both palaces were outwardly western and therefore, could be more easily assimilated into the new discourse, as oppose to the Topkapi Sarayi, which emanated the architecture of an Islamic and Ottoman nature and thus, needed to be controlled and confined to the pages of history and to be molded into the discourse of the state. The end result is a museum that displayed the opulence and glamour of the old Ottoman state and with added commentaries that displayed the “otherness” of the Ottoman’s, all of which was contrast to the new state and thereby reinforcing a negative perception of the Ottomans.

Ataturk and his Republic recognized that Islam and the Ottomans was deeply tied to the Turkish national identity and therefore, Ataturk pragmatically attempted to recreate Turkish identity by delegitimizing Islamic and Ottoman monuments all the while acknowledging the deep-rooted ties that Islam and Ottomans had with Turkish identity. Thus, rather than attempting to eliminate it, Ataturk, and his state attempted to create an alternative Turkish identity that was divorced from both Islam and its recent Ottoman past and this was done through the Turkish National Thesis. The Turkish National Thesis was an attempt to rewrite history in order to show the greatness, virility, and power that the Turkic civilization (the idea of a Turkic civilization was in itself a creation of this rewriting), which was absent of both an Islamic and Ottoman tie. However, one problem that occurred within Istanbul was the presence of two dominating Ottoman Islamic monuments, the Hagia Sophia and the Topkapi Sarayi. Thus, the state decided to reclaim both monuments by selectively remembering certain aspects of each past in order to strengthen the states new Turkish Nationalist ideology. In terms of the Hagia Sophia, its Christian past was highlighted in order to attacking the old Ottoman past and through its transformation into a museum was subsequently secularized, which reduced its Islamic character. This allowed for the highlighting of the progressiveness and Turkish modernity through the creation of a museum and the use of archeologists to uncover its past. For the Topkapi Sarayi, its process of museumification, allowed the Turkish state to control and write a particular version of history that could then be attached to the monument. Rather than highlighting its rich cultural significant, the state chose to depict the imperial power as an opulent, irrational entity that drove itself to its demise. Thus, by using the vehicle of museums, the Turkish state was able to rewrite history in a certain way that would allow the two monuments to not only fit within the discourse that the state was propagating but strengthen it also.

Azak, Umut. Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation State. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010.

Boytner, Ran, Lynn Swartz Dodd, and Bradley J. Parker, eds. Controlling the Past, Owning the Future: The Political Uses of Archaeology in the Middle East. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010.

Dodd, Lynn Swartz and Ran Boytner "Filtering the Past: Archaeology, Politics, and Change." In Controlling the Past, Owning the Future: The Political Uses of Archaeology in the Middle East, edited by Ran Boytner, Lynn Swartz Dodd, and Bradley J. Parker. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010.

Gur, Asli "Political Excavations of the Anatolian Past: Nationalism and Archaeology in Turkey." In Controlling the Past, Owning the Future: The Political Uses of Archaeology in the Middle East, edited by Ran Boytner, Lynn Swartz Dodd, and Bradley J. Parker. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010.

Cagaptay, Soner. Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? New York: Routledge, 2006.

Hanioglu, M. Sukru. Atatrk: An Intellectual Biography. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Kohl, Philip L., Mara Kozelsky, and Ben-Yehuda, Nachman, eds. Selective Remembrances Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007.

Philip L. Kohl, Mara Kozelsky and Nachman Ben-Yehuda "Introduction." In Selective Remembrances Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts, edited by Philip L. Kohl. Mara Kozelsky and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Shaw, Wendy. "The Rise of the Hittite Sun: A Deconstruction of Western Civilization from the Margin." In Selective Remembrances Archaeology in the Construction, Commemoration, and Consecration of National Pasts, edited by Philip L. Kohl, Mara Kozelsky, and Nachman Ben-Yehuda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Lu, Gu. Architecture, Ceremonial, and Power: The Topkapi Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries. New York, N.Y. Architectural History Foundation, 1991

Morey, Charles Rufus. "The Mosaics of Hagia Sophia." The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin 2, no. 7, Pp. 201-210. Accessed December 20, 2014.

Nelson, Robert S. Hagia Sophia, 1850-1950: Holy Wisdom Modern Monument. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

Ozoglu, Hakan. From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011.

Shankland, David. Islam and Society in Turkey. Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1999.

Shaw, Wendy. "Museums And Narratives Of Display From The Late Ottoman Empire To The Turkish Republic." Muqarnas Online, 2007, 253-79.

7

扎本事件的详细 起因

一名德国军官 von Forstner,在1913年10月28日,告诉他手下的军人们, 如果他们被阿尔萨斯人攻击,就该动武。如果在动武的时候伤到了阿尔萨斯人, 那么他就会奖励他们10马克。Von Forstner 还用了一个羞辱阿尔萨斯人的口头语, 称阿尔萨斯人为 Wackes ---这是贬低阿尔萨斯人的用语。这件事被阿尔萨斯媒体发现了,很快被报道。 阿尔萨斯人气坏了, 他们多年对普鲁士的愤恨被激起了。

经过

但是Von Forstner 军官只受到了轻微的处分, 德国方面没有重视这件事情。Von Forstner 军官很快又在阿尔萨斯露面了, 而且还被4名军人做保镖保护。阿尔萨斯人气疯了, 德国不但不惩罚Von Forstner 军官, 居然还给他保镖!大批的阿尔萨斯人对着Von Forstner 军官骂他,他一出面就被大批的年轻阿尔萨斯人羞辱。这些阿尔萨斯人在1913年都是年轻人, 他们是生长在德意志帝国时期的,一直接受德国的教育。 但是他们居然能站出来谴责普鲁士军官,说明阿尔萨斯人并没有被成功的转化成德意志人。德国方面看到事情严重了, 要求阿尔萨斯当地官员Mahl 维持秩序 , Mahl 因为是阿尔萨斯人,拒绝配合普鲁士人。 11月18日, 大批人聚集在德军军营前, 一名军官命令士兵驱赶人群。 德军把大批的阿尔萨斯人赶到了小胡同里, 带走了很多人。 当地的新闻报社也被德军搜查了。

结果

德国方面对此事召开会议, 德皇认为军队的行为都是正确的。 德皇的态度, 让阿尔萨斯人绝望。12月1日, 德军在当地练兵。 一名当地人 Karl Blank在街对面观看, 看到Von Forstner军官装模作样练兵的样子,忍不住大笑,旁边的几个阿尔萨斯人也跟着笑, Von Forstner忍不了了,上去用军刀打了Karl, 让Karl 头部受伤。Von Forstner因此, 只被判决关43天。 然后这个判决又被收回了。 法官认为Von Forstner行为是自卫。虽然Karl 当时身无寸铁, 而Von Forstner身边有5个全副武装的军人。德国方面认为Karl Blank 侮辱了德国。Von Forstner在军队里, 还受到了很多军人的安慰和鼓励-----血浓于水。

扎本事件看似很简单, 其实它不但反应了阿尔萨斯和德国的冲突,更反映了俾斯麦的制度在1914年的德国已经无法维持下去。即使没有一战, 德国1914年的状况也无法维持多久了。一个微不足道的军官, 挑衅了阿尔萨斯人, 居然会引起德国国会要求宰相退位,导致整个阿尔萨斯统治阶级崩溃, 这绝不是一点小事. 这是在一战爆发之前, 德国内部最后一个严重的危机。

扎本事件, 其实再一次上演了1861年-1866年期间,普鲁士的自由主义人士和军国主义的皇室之间的对抗。这件事, 更加说明了,俾斯麦安排的那种贵族秩序在现代德国已经维持不了多久了, 这种贵族封建制度已经完全落伍了。德国大批人,已经无法接受陈旧的贵族军事制度了,俾斯麦建立的社会秩序已经跟不上现代德国的步伐。扎本事件, 让贵族和军队再一次获胜, 就连宰相在军队面前都显得如此苍白,威廉二世在1914年初, 获得这次胜利后, 更加得意。 充满自信的走进了第一次世界大战的不归路。

扎本事件, 其实就是一战的序曲。 皇帝和军队生活在自己的陈旧的世界观里, 跟不上现代德国的潮流和需求。最后害死了德国人民。

“阿尔萨斯人永远也不愿意成为普鲁士人,绝大多数的阿尔萨斯和洛林人, 都愿意留在法国。这并不是因为他们讨厌德国人,而是这两个地区有强烈的自由主义思维 当阿尔萨斯人向法国看的时候, 他能找到存在的意识,存在的价值, 但是当他向德国看的时候, 就失去了存在意识。法国给了阿尔萨斯人飞翔的空间,而德国却把阿尔萨斯困在笼子里。 可惜, 德国没有学习法国的方法, 如果我们不去模仿法国的治国的方法,那么我们永远也不会赢得阿尔萨斯洛林人的灵魂”

5

那是4年,因为我反对not my president运动,并且在同俄门前后支持无罪推定,同样也是很多人都在扯,投票机黑客阴谋论,然后我被某些华人民主党支持臭骂一顿,说我是俄罗斯间谍,今天同样的事情再次发生了,一模一样的配方,现在我是深层政府的代言人了,华裔必须提高自身的政治理解力,以及逻辑水平

5

现在的国际关系理论里面有两个大的流派,自由主义和现实主义(以后有空在介绍一些其他理论可以和中国挂钩的理论),现实主义里面有一种叫做攻势现实主义(offensive realism)。根据这个理论,中国崛起必须要诉诸于武力。

攻势现实主义理论的架构是,没有国际政府,国际社会是一个绝对的无政府状态,所以每一个政权在不知道另一个政权真实的目的之前,必须要保证一支能进攻和保护生存能力的武装力量。所以武装冲突几乎是必然的,特别是大国之前对于霸权的稳定性,如果不使用军事力量,那么大国对霸权范围的小国的效果是几乎没作用的。

根据理论提出者John Mearsheimer的说法,美国自从冷战之后,过于依赖自由主义外交路线,美国尝试不停对其他国家输出自由主义和民主思想来达到美国霸权对世界秩序的稳定性(民主和平论,民主国家之间不战争,以后介绍)。但是历届美国内阁都没有明白,无论在什么国家,特别是某些正在处于威权和集权统治的社会,整个社会的思维永远都是民族主义思想能压倒一切自由主义思想。

所以经过了30年的后冷战外交,建于自由主义之上的美利坚帝国维系的全球秩序不在稳定,并且面临着很多威胁。所以美国必须重回冷战时代的现实主义外交思想,才能维系现在的美国利益,例如放弃意识形态,无论是民主或者独裁,只要亲美就可以扶持。现在很多美国盟友已经对于美国尝试销售美式价值观给他们感到不舒服,例如沙特,作为美国在中东的忠实盟友,确拒绝接受美国价值观,因为美国所倡导的美式自由主义价值观被沙特强大的民族主义给反弹了回来,如果美国要坚持继续向沙特输出美国价值观,那么我们很可能看到的就是另一个伊朗,美国的自由主义外交正在把很多自己的忠实盟友退离美国

对于中国,中国是美国重点输出自由主义思想的目标,但是很显然,中国软硬不吃,即使把中国引入全球贸易,中国依然保持了强大的民族主义。强大民族主义让美式价值观在中国的推行更失败,我们现在已经看到了中国在对长期以来的美式价值观在全球的流行,和美利坚维系的全球秩序进行了猛烈的反弹。对于全世界,特别是非洲国家输出“中国故事”,这对美国的自由主义世界秩序打击很大。而且中国现在作为美国霸权最有力的对手,不得不迫使美国转变外交思维,正如从奥巴马内阁的后期到川普内阁的开始,美国对华政策正在走向传统的现实主义路线。

中美双方不得不经历另一场旷日持久的对抗,而在这个对抗中,中美不一定亲自进行军事冲突,但是代理人战争很显然是必不可免,因为回到冷战的现实主义外交中,放弃意识形态,扶持独裁者是美国必须要做的,正如美国现在正在扶持越南对抗中国,正如在冷战中扶持中国这个意识形态向左的盟友,一切只为了对抗苏联。而全世界独裁者之间的战争必不可免,中国也不可能放弃机会,必定会介入局势,而且中国本身作为一个介于威权集权之前的国家,动用外部压力解决内部面临的问题,无论怎么看,都是非常合理的,正如现在,美国在加强在台湾的南海的军事影响力。

这次新时代的冷战,不仅仅的地缘政治和代理人之间的冲突,同样也显现在技术和商业上面,例如华为禁令和贸易战

4

从前,有位总统叫做撒了太多的谎,他叫Trumpocchio, 一天他输了一次选举,而选举的失败导致了他的谎言和以前都不一样了,Trumpocchio的鼻子开始以轻快的速度成长,它飞出了白宫,飞遍了全国,穿越大海和外国的土地,它飞出大气层,绕地球旋转,最后进入了太空,经过了行星,飞出了银河系,它旅行到了宇宙的尽头,然后进入的平行的疯狂宇宙,卡在了正在通商宽衣的庆丰大帝的屁股里面,庆丰大帝被Trumpocchio的鼻子轻松征服了,于是让他做了疯狂宇宙的新皇帝,终于,在另一个平行的疯狂宇宙里面,Trumpocchio终于完成了他的连任梦想,这次还是无线的连任,没有了该死的华盛顿沼泽,更不需要讲程序正义,从国务院,到人大,连带着整个法院,这次麻利都被神选之人,疯狂宇宙唯一的真神,善良并且代表民意的Trumpocchio,靠着伟大的道德和个人意志,执行了万众所向的拉清单。

4

这个时候站出来让他的支持者放下成见,停止撕裂美国,那么历史依然会记住川普是一个伟大的总统的

4

膜乎不知道为什么最近涌进来一群川粉小号,大叫这破坏程序正义

4

无论是音乐,电影,还是服装,音乐我只喜欢听古典和爵士乐,对现在这些流行音乐都觉得很低端很难听,电影也是只能看好莱坞老的的纯剧情拼演技的片子,特效片同样觉得和低端,无聊,比如新的哥斯拉系列,复仇者系列,完全没兴趣,甚至觉得这些东西太低端到不能叫做艺术,服装平时一般也是衬衣,毛衣,夹克,西装,大衣,这种,穿这那种很奇怪的新设计服装总给我一种低端人口的第一反应

3

中国的传统文化有精华也有糟粕。今天先不论精华,先谈一个危害不浅的糟粕,这就是华夷之变。

华夷之辨也称为夷夏之变,这种观念也算是渊源流长了。可能中华文明有多长的历史,华夷之辨可能就存在了多长的时间。今天虽然没有公然堂而皇之的华夷之辨,但是这一观念却通过各种各样的民俗事项、语言词汇、文化观念保留了下来。比如称呼朝鲜为棒子;称呼日本为倭奴(似乎还需要有更侮辱性的词汇出现);称呼越南为猴子;称呼俄罗斯为毛子;高加索人种为鬼佬、鬼妹。严格来讲这些称呼都并非全中国人对外国、外族的称呼,这些称呼的出现有一定的地域性和文化群体性。历史上,中国也有不同族群之间的相互蔑称,比如北方中国人称南方中国人为南蛮子等,实际上也与华夷之辨有关,或至少遵循的是统一的思维逻辑。这里为了避免不良扩散,也就不多举了,实际上还很多。这也是传统,当然还有一些更加精辟的蔑称。另外传统的十八行省之间相互也有蔑称,不过传播范围比较有限,也不多讲。与之相伴随的还有上国等等文化观念。

华夷之变是中国传统文化的一部分,这一观念对华夏文明的发展造成了严重的伤害。华夷之辨与封建纲常伦理互为表里,并常常与治乱循环相伴随,某种程度上也造成了华夏大地周期性的战乱,文明停滞或倒退。

什么是华夷之辨呢?由于世传的夏代以及可能出现的具体断代时间现在还有争议,所以我们并不太清楚在世传的夏以及商是否就已经存在夷夏之辨,虽然这一观念是以夏命名的,所以存在一定的可能性。但在周代,华夷之辨或曰夷夏之辨就已经出现在明文的典籍当中。华夷之辨与封建制度密切相关,笼统地讲,封建等级制度对内,华夷之辨对外,以周天子为中心等而次之,经典的表述就是“普天之下莫非王土,率土之滨莫非王臣”这是大家都知道的。

具体表现为,以周天子为核心,向内、向外辐射,并以血缘亲疏为主要制度建立核心体系。大体来讲,在这一文化体系当中,周天子居于等级最高的位置,公侯伯子男等而次之,并建立封国,封国再等而次之,封国以外,又有东夷西戎南蛮北狄,生番熟番,再等而次之。实际上在分封的过程中夷夏的界限也不是绝对的,夷夏的主要区别在于其是否接受中原的礼乐制度。夷夏区分也不是现代的民族区分,周代以及后来中国也没有现代国家观念,传统上也只有天下观念。

由于世载的诸夏在具体的时间、地点以及考古实证上还存在争论。所以今天我并不能确定诸夏按照今天的民族学划分,到底属于何种文化人群。甚至就连诸夏本身都有可能在其之前,还存在着较为发达的文明体系。司马迁在史记当中记载“禹兴西羌”,又《说文》“羌本西戎牧羊人”。按理“西羌”当非诸夏,但世载大禹建立了夏代,又或者是本非诸夏的禹进入诸夏建立夏朝,成为正统。由于在这里因为缺乏具体考古实证,而文献佐证这方面也少且大多为传说,也只能臆测。

但我们知道禹、以及世传大禹所建立的夏与商、周皆有不同。我们现在大概知道商人崇尚白色,以玄鸟为图腾,天帝观念极盛,这些习俗、宗教信仰与后来的周人、汉族都有区别。

我们虽然无从知晓“大禹”是否本非诸夏而进入诸夏建立夏代。但我们都很清楚,周人确实与商人不同,周人接受商王的爵号,可能也接受了商的文化体系。近年有研究指出周文化最初源于游牧文化,甚至指出夏、商也有游牧文化的背景,虽难以定论,但这一问题仍应继续存疑、讨论。

不管如何,周人接受过商王的爵号,商王确实也是当时的共主。后来周的势力得到发展,便想要取代商王的地位,这就是大家都知道的武王伐纣。由于夏、商两代对于后来的中国人而言,确实太遥远,所以一般认为华夏礼乐文明比较明确的直接来源应该是周代。因此这又部分程度地造成了中国人似乎都认为自己是周的遗民,加上孔子说他从周,因此周的建立似乎更有合法性与合理性。

因此虽然“武王伐纣”严格来讲并不符合儒家纲常,但仍然要明示“道与无道”作为发动暴力战争的主要理由。周在这一过程当中除了使用暴力,似乎没有找到更好的成为天下共主的办法。“武王伐纣”的行为确实在中国历史上开了一个很不好的头,虽然我们大概也知道一些典籍也谈到,商可能也是通过暴力手段取代了夏的统治,但是商从来也不关心似乎也没有意识到一个“有道、无道”的问题。

但请注意,最为关键的是,周的制度可能与商确实开始出现了一些不同。成熟的礼乐文化和等级制度是由周建立起来的,并非常具有典型性。相对于商,周给人的印象从来都是彬彬有礼、温文尔雅,非常文明,并且有“道”的。但在这当中,周以及周的遗民可能在一个问题上永远都无法自圆其说,这就是“一个自称有道的封国君主,又怎能通过无道的暴力战争来推翻一个天下的共主,虽然这一共主可能是无道的”。因此当周和周的遗民——儒家的孝子贤孙在面对伯夷、叔齐的“登彼西山兮,采其薇矣,以暴易暴兮,不知其非矣”断然不食周禄,愤然绝食饿死在首阳山后,干脆一脚把这两位华夏真正的圣贤踢到了道家的阵营当中。周人和儒家的孝子贤孙是不愿意,也是永远也回答不了这个问题的。

但不愿、不能回答并不代表问题得到了解决。因为理论上的不能自圆其说,周以及周王的冒失行为给后来的华夏文明造成了严重的后果。那就是,实际上不管你有没有道理,只要你够暴力,只要你能通过暴力入主中原,那么不管你是什么身份,在旧体质当中是什么地位,你都可以南面称孤。而只要你能南面称孤,也就不在乎你是蛮夷、强盗、还是要饭的。既然臣下可以称孤,蛮夷又有何不可呢?因为天下说白了其实都不是我们的,天下属于天子。其实这在中国传统社会当中也并不是什么要命的问题。最关键的就是两点:第一、要有强有力的暴力。第二、一定要进入中原。前者是手段,后者只要能够进入中原传统上的诸夏之地,也就有了法理。 因此由于“武王伐纣”的“道”的本身不能自圆其说,不能服天下人,所以所谓的华夷之辨、封建等级、宗法体系也都成了无根之木,无源之水,其理论的荒谬性也就自不待言。 既然你要把人分成三六九等,甚至一些人连做人的资格都没有,只能是如同禽兽一般的蛮夷,你又不能讲出你所以这样做的道理。那么对于被压迫和被侮辱的人而言,该怎么做也就自不待言了。

因而,当周人“伐纣”的虚伪性暴露出来以后,封建制度与华夷之辨的“道”,不过就是一双人人皆可穿也是人人皆可弃的破鞋。当天下、国家(非现代意义上的)大体上还没有出现问题的时候,大家都还能勉强各安其分,当这个天下、国家开始稍微暴露出一些问题以后,大家就开始乃心在咸阳了。只要战端一起,真正能够保全自己、获得利益的也就只能是暴力。因此这几千年来,被周王、周人蔑视的蛮夷来过,所谓的贵族来过,强盗来过,饥民来过,要饭的也来过,实际上都不成问题。

武王伐纣,不过预示着华夏治乱更替、周期循环的开始。

公元前606年,被周王蔑为蛮夷的楚军观兵周疆,问鼎中原。

公元前256年,为周王养马的秦人弑掉了最后一代周王不久代周而立。

公元前202年,刘邦称帝。

公元220年,汉献帝刘协禅位,难能可贵没有被弑。

公元260年,高贵乡公被弑,预示着后来的天下大乱。

被周人蔑称的蛮夷来了

蛮夷与汉人通婚的子孙来了

做臣子的来了

蛮夷又来了

要过饭的来了

蛮夷又来了

东瀛的也想来

……………………

由此可见,由于封建文化是华夏文明的重要文化,因此随着华夏文明的传播、化育,封建文化也不断由华夏中心向四周辐射、扩散。封建制度与华夷之辨互为表里,相互渗透、相互依存。而武王伐纣又将暴力战争的恶果种在了华夏文明当中,由于本身的非法性,以及自身的理论缺陷又导致了中国历史上的政权更替往往也只能通过暴力实现。华夏文明呈现出治乱更替,周期循环的特点。华夷之辨不过是封建制度的进一步外化,其核心都可以归结到以血亲为核心建立的专制统治体系,贻害中国不浅。

如今中国虽然已经不是封建社会,但是将人等级划分的思想与意识依然存在,华夷之辨的思想可能还有残留。这些封建意识是否会进一步贻害中国,还有待观瞻。

3

司法不能被民意主导,法国大革命的教训历历在目,民意不会是理智的,更不会讲程序正义,西方社会的成功建立在法制上远大于民主上面,英国是先有大宪章才有选区制度的。

司法不但能保护好人声张正义的权利,更是要保护坏人一样不能被迫害

法官无论在什么时候,都不能让法官听取民意,必须按照理性与规则来宣判,否则司法的概念就不存在了,没了司法才是社会开始垮塌的开始

3

今天网上已经乱成一团糟了,各种阴谋论充斥着网络,用fake news战胜了正常人的逻辑,双方已经彻底把政敌当成了赶尽杀绝的对象,川普不是神选之人,也不是美国希特勒,拜登不是共产党间谍,更不是美国的拯救者,用用逻辑想一下就知道,就算想当希特勒和共产党间谍都会被系统制约。

对于网上这些没有脑子的极端主义者,某些我就是真理,我代表正义,不认可我的都是共产党的宣传机器。那么我就想问你们几个问题,你们这些混蛋有几个做过对美国政治体系研究的人,你们有几个是注册的共和党或者民主党甚至是其他小党的正规党员,你们有几个参加或者竞选过州或者联邦的公职,你们有几个参加过某个公职候选人的拉票志愿者,你们有几个参加过选举的志愿者,大部分人甚至连票都是今年第一次去投票,你们今天在网上到处谩骂政见不同的人,有这个闲空却不愿意花时间仔细了解一下美国社会运作的规矩,如果给你们一把枪,是不是今天就要去决斗?

任何国家的民主政治都是在互相妥协的基础上,几个政治利益团体互相各自后退一步,这样国家才能发展,而不是把政见不同的人往死里打,斯大林的大清洗你们都了解吧

拜登家族和中国有交易,川普上台前也有,4年前,你们要不要也把在伊万卡批判一番,老布什要不要也回到12年前批判一番,这个真的没意思,竞选的时候双方正常的操作都是往死里挖黑料,这恰恰是竞选最伟大的地方,让选民在未来的4年里面更容易的监管自己总统,知道在什么方面对总统更应该严格注意

媒体问题我早就说过,你不喜欢NYT就去看WSJ,美国是个自由市场,你以为是中国媒体必须更党性,这两家天天对骂都是明面的事,但是我个人建议还是混起来看,才能得到最公正的信息

如果一次大选就能把这些自己号称自己是中国民主派的人都变成一个一个的小共产党,动不动就要互相清算,却学不会民主最伟大的后退一步的思维,那么中国的民主迟早完蛋

我坚决反对民主党弹劾川普,因为美国需要康复,希望拜登能用自己的影响力,号召自己的支持者原谅川普,并且自己亲自赦免川普,正如美国历届总统对前任的做法,保持这个后退一步的传统,我也坚决反对川普在走过程序之后继续不认输,还是因为美国需要康复,希望川普能用自己的影响力,让自己的选民接受拜登政府,并且配合拜登政府愈合美国,这个道理希望极端主义者们理解

3

脑残粉的破坏力不见得比极左差,人类一旦失去了正常的思维,那么迟早这样

近期美国打砸抢案件曝光 在联邦指控的51个案件中,目前没有极左,只有极右组织。 https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/06/10/51-protesters-facing-federal-charges-yet-no-sign-of-antifa-involvement/?sh=45d2d6bb4138

明州砸店案: Minneapolis police say 'Umbrella Man' was a white supremacist trying to incite George Floyd rioting https://www.startribune.com/police-umbrella-man-was-a-white-supremacist-trying-to-incite-floyd-rioting/571932272/

南卡游行袭警案(这是“第二宗”由右翼在示威时袭警的案件): https://www.wistv.com/2020/06/05/rcsd-second-man-accused-violence-affiliated-with-extreme-boogaloo-group-arrested/

2

紧跟本站热点话题

两百年前,在1814年4月,拿破仑作为法兰西第一帝国的皇帝,对反法同盟宣布投降。他将放弃自己的帝位,并将终生居住在厄尔巴岛上,作为反法同盟最有力的打手,俄罗斯帝国的士兵们进军巴黎,这是冷战之前俄罗斯帝国最后的高光时刻。正如同那个欧洲近代历史上,一直是邻国噩梦的战争狂,法国再次崛起,欧洲列强们也为了维系自己好不容易建立起来的反法同盟,于是签署了著名的维也纳会议共识(Le congrès de Vienne),用来维持欧洲大陆未来的战略平衡。

在维也纳会议的40年之后,在克里米亚半岛和黑海的“东方问题”才暴露的出来,但是在这之前,号称欧洲宪兵的俄罗斯帝国才是当时欧洲大陆之上的霸主,统治这欧洲外交。俄罗斯武力参与对1848匈牙利革命的镇压,直接武力干涉了奥地利帝国的内政问题,以此可见俄罗斯当时的力量。俄罗斯武力胁迫使奥斯曼帝国的苏丹于1833年签署了《汉卡·伊斯基莱西条约》(Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi ),该条约只会使土耳其海峡开放给俄罗斯黑海舰队进入地中海。

从英国和法国的角度来看,俄罗斯正在威胁整个欧洲大陆及其强大的海外帝国的利益。俄罗斯无疑挑战了欧洲大陆的力量平衡体系,这导致英国和法国最终决定帮助奥斯曼帝国与俄罗斯作战。 克里米亚战争是在地缘政治,民族主义和宗教兴起下为外交和政治原因而进行的战争。与欧洲之前发生的战争相比,宗教起着较小的作用。在战争期间,新崛起的民族主义开始取代宗教的角色。克里米亚战争是古典的现代战争,因为这场战争遵循现代战争的原则的同时无法抛弃一些古典的原则,“战争是政治的延续”。 《巴黎条约》于1856年结束了这场战争,这也决定了未来的海洋国际法,今天的土耳其海峡规则和当今的俄罗斯地缘政治。

巴尔干地区长久以来都有着宗教冲突,天主教,东正教与穆斯林,在这个地区鱼龙混杂,即使的强悍集权的奥斯曼政府,也无法撼动巴尔干的宗教问题。但更重要的是,帝国主义,社会达尔文主义和民族主义的观念在此时开始在欧洲兴起。对于像俄罗斯帝国这样的伟大帝国来说,宗教问题只是一个很好的幌子。俄罗斯帝国作为一个高等民族,斯拉夫种族的代表,将“帮助”他们的斯拉夫兄弟,同时也是获得他们应有的土地。同时也是可以捍卫虔诚的东正教徒的利益,简直是名利双收。

英法联军愿意以“帮助奥斯曼帝国摆脱俄罗斯,奥斯曼民族的独立和自由”的名义参加这场战争。这不是帮助奥斯曼帝国或帮助其他国家。因为法国海军和英国海军都考虑过俄罗斯海军是否有权通过土耳其海峡。俄罗斯将反对法国在地中海和近东的利益,同时,和欧洲大陆最强大力量进行的战争将帮助第二法兰西帝国恢复昔日荣耀的拿破仑时代。这个时代,不仅仅是俄罗斯自己,欧洲最早获得现代民族主义战争洗礼的法国,依然保持着不减当年雄风的民族主义思维,法国民族主义者们,也是当时几乎全部的法国人,难以忍受俄罗斯以及整个维也纳会议体系对法兰西民族的压迫。当时的法兰西第二帝国的皇帝,拿破仑三世,完美的利用了法国当时的民族主义思维,作为法理借口当选了总统直至称帝。他宣布他将重现他叔叔的荣光,恢复那个伟大的法兰西第一帝国。而特别是对待俄罗斯帝国的战争,这个老民族敌人的战争,将当时刚刚成为皇帝,法理基础尚不稳定的拿破仑三世稳固权利的最佳方案。

从英国的角度来看,正如同英国人古老但是好用的外交信条的大陆孤立主义,英国人始终相信,通过支持欧洲大陆上的其他的强权之间的互相战争,从而能够削弱欧洲大陆上的这些力量,而且同时可以避免他们互相联合起来单独针对英国,当他们相互斗争时,英国将强大而安全。特别是英国在拿破仑战争中的胜利使这一想法变得更加牢固。从地缘政治的角度来看。如果俄罗斯能够通过土耳其海峡进入地中海,大英帝国的动脉,远在埃及新建的苏伊士运河将受到俄罗斯的威胁。英国肯定会保护通往印度的贸易之路。这是众所周知的大英帝国的东方问题。

尼古拉斯一世在1825年成为俄罗斯皇帝。他是对东方充满野心的皇帝,特别是对奥斯曼帝国“欧洲病夫”的领土侵占欲。正如他说的,“beardies...the bear is dying... you may give him musk but even musk will not long keep him alive”。此刻,英国政府开始难以接受俄罗斯向东方扩张的步伐。1833年的《汉卡·伊斯凯莱西条约》(Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi)土耳其开放海峡仅仅给俄罗斯帝国,即使是战争的时候,这件事使英国真正开始考虑俄罗斯最终将打破欧洲大陆的力量平衡。英国这个时代的民族主义开始变得疯狂的针对俄罗斯,而不是之前的法国,英国的民族主义者们,甚至提出了充满种族歧视的“俄罗斯恐惧症”(Russophobia)的概念,仅仅是因为俄罗斯威胁到了英国的大陆平衡外交政策。同时,作为“欧洲宪兵”,俄罗斯,也是封建主义最佳的守护神,俄罗斯联合当地众多封建贵族,在中欧疯狂的镇压资产阶级革命。此举完全不利于控制多数报纸和议会席位的英法资产阶级的利益,加上资产阶级对同是资产阶级的同情思维,以及思想上的互相认可。“俄罗斯恐惧症”成为英国对俄罗斯的新外交政策,英国于1844年在《内塞罗德备忘录》( Nesselrode Memorandum)中向俄罗斯发出警告信号“Russia and England have an equal in uniting their efforts in order to keep up the existence of the Ottoman Empire”.

在这个时代,基督教的圣地彻底处于异教奥斯曼帝国的完全控制之下,但是考虑道帝国境内庞大的基督教人口的稳定问题,加上换股四周的基督教强敌之间的和平问题,基督教圣地和通往奥斯曼境内朝圣的基督徒在奥斯曼帝国一直享有特权。在三十年战争之后,圣地的保护权一直是由奥斯曼帝国单方面出让给法国。这意味着这片土地将由天主教会控制,直到1774年《库克·卡纳卡条约》(Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca),在俄罗斯的压力下,圣地的保护权被再次单方面出让给俄罗斯,因此在奥斯曼境内的基督教圣地上,直接被俄罗斯政府控制的东正教会会获得更多的利益和话语权。这件事,对于拿破仑三世是一个完美的机会,这个时候,他需要的是境内与境外的双重力量的支持。而利用宗教事件为借口,进而击败俄罗斯,会让他的统治权达到高光时刻。自1815年之后,欧洲列强们打造了两条看似无坚不摧的锁链锁住了法国的侵略欲,四国同盟( Quadruple Alliance)与神圣同盟(Holy Alliance)。由于现在正在升温的东方问题,英国,俄罗斯,奥地利开始互相的外交关系急转而下,甚至走向了敌对。拿破仑三世放弃了法国对埃及的利益,承认了埃及利益完全归属于英国,进而改善了自拿破仑战争之后两国互相敌对的关系。拿破仑三世同时操控了意大利的民族主义者与他们的武装力量,用奥地利在意大利的利益,威胁奥地利在这次战争中站在了中立的一方。自1848年匈牙利革命以来,奥地利和俄罗斯一直保持着良好的外交关系,但两国之间在巴尔干地区的冲突以及奥地利的内在问题也使奥地利想远离这场战争。无论法国在这场战争中是输还是赢,最终的结果总是会通过打破四国同盟( Quadruple Alliance)与神圣同盟(Holy Alliance)而使法国受益。

1852年,在法国人的支持和压力下,奥斯曼帝国将圣地的保护权交还给法国统治下的天主教会。因此,沙皇派遣亲王 Aleksander Danilovich Menshikov去到了伊斯坦布尔,在尝试和平的外交手段夺回东正教的圣地保护权无果之后,沙皇亲自向奥斯曼苏丹发送了战争威胁,如果奥斯曼帝国不愿意将圣地保护权返还给东正教会,俄罗斯将会以战争为手段,夺回圣地保护权。奥斯曼苏丹完全不担心与俄罗斯的战争,因为他现在已经得到了法国的全部支持。他在伦敦的大使Kostaki Musurus也给他带来了好消息“Russophobia” was going on in England.”。欧洲当时的舆论也全站在了奥斯曼的一方,将俄罗斯视为恐怖的侵略者,而奥斯曼则是可怜的受害者。特别是刚刚见到了俄罗斯镇压资产阶级革命手段的报纸商和股东们,更是借用报纸,对俄罗斯不留情面的进行疯狂的攻击。”同时,奥斯曼帝国的苏丹也需要进行一场战争,以使奥斯曼帝国的民族主义者平静下来,以保证自己的法理统治权与现实的权利。在伊斯坦布尔,民族主义也强烈崛起。奥斯曼民族主义者希望奥斯曼帝国从俄罗斯手中夺回自己的土地。通过历史,俄罗斯认为自己对奥斯曼的战争将会毫无压力的取胜,因为俄罗斯的军事实力是完全胜于奥斯曼的,但是俄罗斯确犯了一个重大的外交错误,不应该同时挑战英法两个强国的共同利益,英国和法国是历史上的传统敌人,但是此时此刻,他们都有共同的利益,这就是俄罗斯的威胁。法国不会与拿破仑三世承诺的任何英国利益抗争,特别是在埃及。英国将与老敌人法国结盟,一起对抗俄罗斯。

1855年,奥地利作为中立国和俄罗斯的老朋友,将最终决定和最大的打击带给了亚历山大二世,在尼古拉一世死后即位的新沙皇。奥地利拒绝对克里米亚战争中的俄罗斯施以援手。奥地利出卖了俄罗斯,如果俄罗斯不投降,奥地利和英法联军一起参战。奥地利清楚地了解世界的现状,为了从奥地利本身获得更多利益,奥地利最终决定与英国和法国一起加入。这是压倒俄罗斯帝国的最后一根稻草。俄罗斯它已经输掉了这场战争,无论在外交或军事上。俄罗斯的最后希望,俄罗斯它已经输掉了这场战争,在外交或军事上都没有关系。俄罗斯的最后希望,这这一条约被称为《巴黎条约》( Treaty of Paris)。在该条约的谈判中,作为在克里米亚击败俄罗斯的主要领导人,拿破仑三世不希望削弱俄罗斯,与英国和奥地利相比。拿破仑三世之所以这样做,是因为他不希望看到一个在东方一家独大的大英帝国,并且他试图使俄罗斯人成为法国的忠实盟友,而不是背叛俄罗斯的老盟友们。巴黎条约规定,黑海是中立海,任何海军都不得越过土耳其海峡。该条约的一部分成为了现代国际海洋法。

这长战争对未来的欧洲产生极大影响,这是第一次世界大战之前最大的战争,第一次世界大战的思维与盟友关系主要来自这场战争。民族主义思想和外交目标下的盟友制度“一个国家没有永久的朋友,只有永久的利益”就从这次彻底开场。对于俄罗斯而言,自彼得大帝以来,这场战争摧毁了俄罗斯进入更温暖的海洋的梦想。这场战争之后,俄罗斯决定在亚洲扩张,直到在日俄战争中再次失败。对于英国而言,这是一场战争,确实使英国建立了“日不落帝国”,并进入了维多利亚时代的黄金时代。对于法国来说,这是一次将法国带回到光荣岁月的战争,但是拿破仑三世接管了俄罗斯的旧工作,法国成为了欧洲的新宪兵。这种无用的地位导致法国进入中欧的沼泽,并越来越深入,直到法国将战争输给普鲁士。对于奥地利来说,这是奥地利的重大外交错误,奥地利失去了昔日的最重要的盟友俄罗斯。奥地利被其他欧洲大国孤立,因此,奥地利输掉了奥普战争。对于普鲁士来说,这场战争对于普鲁士来说是一个巨大的机会,而中欧不再有俄罗斯的参与,而奥地利也将是一个疲软的国家,这为普鲁士提供了一个在1871年崛起并统一德国的绝好机会。这场战争方式永远改变了欧洲。民族主义的观念取代了宗教。这是欧洲进入民族主义和帝国主义战争新时代的象征,人们没有说他们为国王或女王而战,他们会和任何的外国作战争,如果外国侵犯了自己的国家利益。这是现代欧洲的开始。资产阶级阶级在欧洲兴起。通过这场战争,欧洲大国也意识到工业化的力量可以轻易地转化为杀戮机器,就像法国和英国在克里米亚战争中的技术优势武器的力量一样。这场战争还制定了第一部现代海洋国际法,黑海和土耳其海峡的法规,这些现在仍然影响着土耳其和俄罗斯。

2

如果说有什么国民党做的让我支持的事情,那就是没打压新文化运动,个人感觉中国传统文化中,充满了不平等,压迫人的思想,特别是完全不把女性当然人看,类似中医这些理论,更是完全缺乏科学常识的东西,不治死人就已经很不错的东西为什么会有人追捧,白话文也更符合正常人的学习与习惯,语言和书面基本统一,相比文言文完全就是另一种语言,中国传统文化中更没有任何的民主基因,也对不同种族充满极度的歧视思维