当地时间5月25日，美国明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯市街头，46岁的非洲裔司机乔治.弗洛伊德因被无端怀疑购物时使用了一张20美元假钞，遭德雷克.肖万等4名警察暴力对待，最终不治身亡。

以此为导火索，自当地时间5月26日以来，抗议示威在包括首都华盛顿在内，美国全境众多城镇不断爆发，愈演愈烈，尽管包括遇难者家属在内的许多人呼吁“和平抗争”，但事态仍很快在多地演变为骚乱。

众所周知，作为新冠肺炎疫情冲击最严重、累计确诊数和总死亡人数双双高居全球第一的“重灾区”，美国社会本就在“抗疫”和“重启”两难中挣扎彷徨、左右为难。如今一波未平，一波又起，如燎原烈火般旬日间燃遍全国的暴力、骚乱，无疑令美国社会雪上加霜。正如许多媒体、评论家所言，无论任何理由，都不能成为挑起和实施骚乱、煽动并纵容暴力的借口。

人是有记忆的高级动物。目睹此情此景，不免让人联想到曾几何时，当香港街头爆发骚乱、动荡时，个别美国政要令人瞩目的言论。如民主党籍众院议长南希·佩洛西，去年6月就曾盛赞香港示威是“一道美丽的风景线”，是“争取民主和法治的非暴力示威”，并将香港街头的激进分子称作“勇士”。

如今似曾相识的一幕在美国各地街头重演，且规模、“烈度”有过之无不及。不知目睹这一切的佩洛西等政要，会否也将这些激进暴力行为视作“争取民主和法治的非暴力示威”，将带头打砸烧抢的激进分子称作“勇士”？是否也会饱蘸激情地讴歌这一道道出现在本土和身边的“美丽风景线”？

佩洛西显然不会这么认为。她说，“这真是一场悲剧。这是一种犯罪。”“它伤透了你们的心。它真的伤透了你们的心。这太令人悲伤。但必须要有，必须要有人被绳之以法。”显然，当本国与他国面临类似的暴乱时，佩洛西采取了“双标”的评价，这不是一个人道主义的做法。

今年是美国的选举年，在朝在野的政党、政客，都苦心孤诣地试图从一切突发事件中得到“选举收益”，包括揽功于己，诿过于人，也包括竭力将自己塑造为群体事件众多参与者的“知心人”、“自己人”，将政治对手映射为“对立面”、“肇事者”，目的无非争取更多投向自己的选票。此番“弗洛伊德事件”爆发至今，美国朝野两党照样将这一“常规套路”耍得很熟。但事实证明，随着事态的恶化、暴力的升级和骚乱的蔓延，被骚乱、暴力波及的方方面面和每个人，都无一例外变成了受害者。

从这个角度来看，持续多时的香港骚乱、暴力已严重伤害当地社会秩序、经济、就业和民生，伤害到每一个相关方面和相关者，这充分证明了一个铁的事实：骚乱和暴力何时何地都绝不会是“一道美丽的风景线”。如今，“弗洛伊德事件”所引发的美国各地骚乱、暴力，再次雄辩地证明了这个铁一般的事实。

“己所不欲，勿施于人”，将心比心，我们既然不愿在香港等本国领土上出现导致每个人都受到伤害、损失的骚乱、暴力，自然也不愿这样的骚乱、暴力、伤害和损失，发生在任何国家、任何社会、任何人身上，这当然也包括美国——因此，我们并没有打算幸灾乐祸，也没有欢呼大洋彼岸“亮丽风景线”的意图。

我们只是珍惜本国领土上的和平、安宁和稳定，只是希望在同样遭遇骚乱、暴力伤害后，大洋彼岸的人们能理解、尊重，或起码正视我们这种愿景的正当性，我们更希望，中国香港也好，美国华盛顿或明尼阿波利斯也罢，地球上每个角落，都不再被骚乱、暴力所侵袭困扰，更希望任何地方、任何时间、由任何人挑起和实施的骚乱、暴力，都不会被任何方面以任何理由，再涂抹上“亮丽风景线”之类的“伪装色”。

□李厚何（专栏作者）

编辑 胡博阳 实习生 张晓雨 校对 何燕 http://www.bjnews.com.cn/opinion/2020/05/31/733318.html

别人的博客

http://chuangcn.org/2019/10/baffled-beijingers/

Here we publish an intake submitted by a reader who lives in Beijing. The piece provides detailed insights into how a certain group of mainland white-collar workers view the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, and how their understanding has been shaped over the past few months. The reality described by this piece is disappointing, as reality often tends to be. Our goal in publishing it is, however, not to dash any optimism against the sharp rocks of the real world, but instead to point out that the only hope worth having is one that can traverse this deadly, disappointing terrain with optimism in hand. This can only be done through a rigorous, empirical investigation of our present reality.

What hope does this piece offer for directions forward? Those of us living in China often feel similarly hopeless, despite the fact that we regularly interact with the country’s tiny minority of leftists and labor activists who hold views that are at least broadly in line with our own. However, the past few years of repression (most recently targeting leftists and labor organizations, following on the heels of similar crackdowns against feminists and others) has narrowed this space substantially, cutting us off from the already small handful of friends with whom we felt any sort of political camaraderie. At the same time, those who remain are probably more representative of the broader masses of Chinese workers — whether white collar, blue or pink — than the more outward-oriented leftists who suffered worst in the crackdowns. Among those remaining, the college-educated office personnel of Beijing who are highlighted in this piece would be expected to be an exception: they are the Chinese citizens who have VPNs (or did until increased censorship recently blocked most of them), regularly criticize the CCP and have historically been sympathetic to Hong Kong liberalism. But the conversations cited below reveal that this position has become far more complex in response to the anti-extradition movement, pushing some of these erstwhile liberal or otherwise apolitical women and men toward a position that is solidly nationalist, anti-democratic and in favor of wide-ranging repressive measures.

We will explore this phenomenon in more detail in a forthcoming intake about the rise and solidification of a new Chinese nationalist right over the past year, in response to the trade war as well as the anti-extradition movement, especially among college students. The account below mainly reflects the situation of white-collar workers in Beijing, centered on those who imagine themselves relatively cosmopolitan, liberal and critical of the CCP.

–Chuang

When thousands first took to the streets in Hong Kong against the extradition bill in early June, few of the 1.3 billion people to the north in the mainland would have known. Social media controls blocked most posts related to the Hong Kong protests, and state media outlets did not publish a word on sensitive situation in the city. But much has changed since then. Now, not a day goes by without China’s central television blasting footage of fire in the streets of Hong Kong, and police press conferences citing the number of arrests in each day’s demonstrations. At first, when there was no news about Hong Kong in the mainland, I wished friends here – at least those who, like most people, have no access to VPNs to reach beyond the Great Firewall – could hear about what was happening in Hong Kong. Now that state media has whipped the country into a nationalistic fervor to defend “national unity,” I long for the days of the media blackout.

State media was put in an awkward position by the outbreak of protests in Hong Kong. When the first reports broke, mass protests appeared to have happened out of the blue, bewildering many of my friends here in Beijing. Weeks of silence had left mainlanders without any background on the situation until the first reports appeared in state media in mid-June. They missed the introduction of the extradition bill by the Hong Kong government in February, and the rallies and public debate about the bill that developed into the summer. There were still no reports when hundreds of thousands were on the streets demanding the withdrawal of the extradition bill on June 9th, or when bean bag rounds flew and tear gas billowed around the Legislative Council building on June 12th. Then on June 13th Xinhua ran its first major article, entitled “The Majority of Hongkongers Support the ‘Extradition Bill’, Avoid Hong Kong Becoming a ‘Fugitive’s Paradise.’” The article was forced to recount the background of the protest movement that, until then, had not been covered by mainland press. The article spoke of the Hong Kong man who murdered a woman in Taiwan, and the months of preparations by the Hong Kong government to amend its laws to allow him to be extradited to the mainland. It did not tell of the months of smaller scale demonstrations against the bill, or local discussions warning of discontent, but the Xinhua post did cite a petition started in April by pro-mainland group “Safeguard Hong Kong”, which claimed to have the signatures 900,000 Hongkongers supporting the bill.

Xinhua and other state media were hard pressed to explain, then, why 2 million Hongkongers, in a city of just 7 million people, took to the streets against the bill later that week, on June 16th. Just before the planned demonstrations that day, mainland papers ran a statement from the mainland government’s Hong Kong Liason Office, warning of “foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong,” a ridiculous claim. Though foreign governments and intelligence agencies were no doubt on the scene, and regularly met with political leaders like Joshua Wong, or funded top political leaders in the “democracy movement” like Benny Tai, they clearly could not mobilize a third of the city’s population, nor direct the “black mobs” to clash with the hated police – “raptors” who swooped in to drag off protesters by the dozens, or infiltrated demonstrations dressed as protestors, or allowed mainland security forces to operate within police ranks.[1]

News and pictures of the mass marches still trickled through, circulated on WeChat and other social media, and I recall some of my mainland friends supporting protesters in Hong Kong, and thinking it a shame that Beijing had so quickly eroded barriers between the city and the mainland. In June there was still ample evidence that many mainlanders who sympathized with Hong Kong were skirting censorship to show their support. But these more sympathetic interpretations and sentiments were quickly drowned out by the escalating propaganda campaign. Social media controls tightened, and the Hong Kong protests slowly became a daily news item. Mainland officials had to put together a common message. A line was quickly drawn to single out the “violent” and “extreme” protesters, who were allegedly incited by “hostile foreign forces,” mainly the US (though China also publicly lashed out at the EU, UK, Germany and other foreign governments who issued statements against police violence).

The narrative, however, remained a bit confusing, and mainland coverage continued to be viewed by some of my friends as suspicious and incoherent. One asked, for example, if protests were mostly by a few violent extremists in the financial and political centers on Hong Kong island, why were there so many reports of police arrests (which mainland news published with relish) throughout Kowloon and the more rural parts of the New Territories in the north? Were the extremists organized in cells throughout the city? Or were the protests larger than CCTV reported? Of course, many mainland friends are perfectly aware of state censorship, and know that the outlets may be telling half truths at best when it comes to politically sensitive issues. But without readily available alternatives, the confusion only seemed to accumulate, as the situation in Hong Kong itself continued to develop and become more complex day by day.

The storming of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council building on July 1st shocked another friend in Beijing. After watching clips of the footage circulating online, she was beside herself with confusion and disbelief. “I thought Hongkongers were peaceful people,” she said. “What has made them so angry and violent? I guess the rumors of foreign influence must be true. Why would they do this?” Few in the mainland would have had access to coverage of events like these, or they would have been able to read inside stories detailing how a group of young Hongkongers voted to storm the building in a Telegram chat without much prior planning, just as many of the protest actions are decided: collectively, on mobile chat platforms.

Mainlanders watching the news would have difficulty understanding the role of Beijing in the intransigent government, which has both supported, but also hamstrung Carrie Lam – along with her government and police force – by forcing them to maintain an absolute hardline on protests. Mainlanders may have caught the Global Times report denouncing an explosive leaked speech by Lam to a group of businesspeople as “fake news.” Lam explained rather candidly to the group that “if she had a choice”, she would quit. “The room, the political room for the chief executive who, unfortunately, has to serve two masters by constitution, that is the central people’s government and the people of Hong Kong, that political room for maneuvering is very, very, very limited,” said Lam. Hong Kong government sources also revealed to Reuters, which is blocked in the mainland, that the central government had blocked a move by Hong Kong’s leaders to give concessions to protesters and withdraw the extradition bill at least a month before Lam’s government’s official withdrawal in early September.

This may have even been a unilateral move by Lam, the only one of the “five demands” her government could stomach as a bone thrown to protestors or to calm the business elite, though it’s difficult to tell. Many Hong Kong capitalists had long seen the extradition law, and perhaps the broader encroachment of Beijing on their exclusive domain, as “bad for business”. Money flowed to Singapore and other markets as the government pressed forward with the bill. The other demands – like the release of the hundreds of arrested protesters, or an independent enquiry into police violence – would have only mattered to the people of Hong Kong, were politically costly to the government, and didn’t cost business a dime either way. Lam could not, and would not, resign, and universal suffrage would be too costly – quite literally – for the city, as outlined by her predecessor CY Leung: “If it’s entirely a numbers game and numeric representation, then obviously you’d be talking to the half of the people in Hong Kong who earn less than US$1,800 a month [HK$13,964.2],” he said in an interview in 2014. Lam could, of course, be frank with business leaders, while she continued to lie through her teeth to the public, and send more (increasingly militarized) police at protesters.

Tensions – between Hong Kong and the mainland, and within the city itself – came to a head on China’s National Day on October 1st. Carrie Lam partied in Beijing while the city erupted in protest and an 18 year old protester was shot point blank in the chest by a police officer. Of course no news of the protests blared on CCTV that day, only the orgy of militarism and national pride. Xi Jinping did, however, make one reference to Hong Kong in his short speech at the opening of the military parade, saying that China must adhere to the “one country, two systems” policy, just before miles of soldiers, tanks, missiles and drones rolled down Chang’an Street and past Tiananmen Square. My colleagues watched with pride and pleasure, except for one, who is from Hong Kong. She spent the evening in tears. Having watched the footage of the young man shot in the streets of Hong Kong on loop all afternoon, the boom of the fireworks at night in Beijing were too much for her to bear.

It is now clear that many of my friends and colleagues who once kept an open mind about protests, or were perhaps only curious about the novel mass protests, are decidedly on the side of the central government against Hong Kong. What I have found particularly alarming is the loss of any sense of subtlety, or desire to understand the intricacies of the situation. Some have clamped down hard on easy to understand, pithy ideas. I hear them say things like: “well, Hongkongers have decided on independence, so they have all crossed the line. They are beyond reason.” Many of my friends have often been openly critical of the CCP in the past, and stray from the party line on any number of controversial issues, like Xinjiang’s camps, or the ever-expanding police state, with its Great Firewall and surveillance cameras on every street corner. Recently, however, at least on Hong Kong, it seems that when push comes to shove, some have retreated to a sort of raw nationalism, defending some idea of Chinese-ness. The desecration of symbols like Chinese national flags, or the booing at the Chinese national anthem quickly became topics of discussion at the office water cooler, as they were circulated widely on WeChat. “The mistake these Hongkongers make is that they forget they are Chinese. They are becoming racist, and hateful of their own homeland, and that is just unacceptable,” said one. Of course, examples of rising hatred against Hong Kongers in the mainland were not circulated on WeChat, like the beating of a Hong Kong hockey club at a tournament in Shenzhen, after they won over a mainland opponent. “I think the only way out of this situation is for Hong Kong to be returned to China a second time,” said another, referring to the 1997 handover of the city, a former colony of Britain.

I grant that these may be the views of a few privileged elite in the capital, who, as a habit, read and discuss the news about Hong Kong, or the US-China trade war, or conflicts in the Middle East, largely for sport. It cannot be said to reflect the views of the average mainlander, from the coast to the inland provinces, or the rural to urban migrant. At least around me, however, the state narrative seems to have taken a firm hold after these months, moving from silence to a full-blown propaganda war. Combined with censorship and a clampdown on independent conversations, it has taken firm hold on the hearts and minds of many who would more naturally be more sympathetic observers. While the current situation among my colleagues seems bleak, it is also clear that if citizens had greater access to information, the cost to the state would indeed be heavy. At the least, it would make it harder for many like my colleagues to fall into narrative of the state, which is undying allegiance to the state, the party, and the idea of the Chinese people in a time of crisis: As the March of the Volunteers, the national anthem, proclaims: “The Chinese nation is now facing its greatest danger. Everyone must let out one last cry. Arise! Arise! Arise! We millions are of one heart. Brave the enemies’ gunfire! March on!”

–Bob, a reader based in Beijing

October 7th, 2019

按：新冠病毒疫情下东亚裔在美国受到的歧视增多，而中国国内歧视外国人的现象也加剧了海外中国人面对的阻力。

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001087382?page=1

今年年初，中国全国的新冠病毒疫情正式爆发。随着特朗普政府对华关闭边境，我和其他在美国的华人取消了回中国探亲的计划；不少回乡庆祝春节的人滞留在国内，无法回到校园和办公室里。

在为家人朋友的健康、安全担忧的同时，我们还为在太平洋彼岸自己的境况焦虑。虽然美国并未限制中国公民入境，但不少华人取消了短期出国的计划，怕因为护照上的出生地引起不必要的麻烦。当“中国”成为了新冠病毒的代名词，东亚裔在全美受到了各种各样的歧视。旧金山州立大学的研究表示，仅在1月28日至2月24日之间就有超过1000起针对亚裔的种族歧视案件。从社交媒体上传播的视频中不难发现，这其中不少甚至涉及到了暴力行为。在法国，华人们举着 “我不是病毒（Je ne suis pas un virus）”的牌子，在社交媒体上发声。食客们也开始避免亚洲餐厅，让华人区的中餐馆生意备受打击。

身在美国，我自己在人群密集的场所也一直避免佩戴口罩，以免引起不必要的关注。讽刺的是，在美国大多数华人当时都未曾访问中国，且由于边境政策，有中国旅游史的民众很难回到美国。针对亚裔的种族歧视，似乎只能反映施暴者的愚昧和无知。

中国疫情好转了，北美的疫情却不断加剧。随着境外输入案例的不断增加，海外回到中国的旅客成为了政府和民众重点警觉的对象。一个月来，政府先是强制 14 天集中隔离，再禁止外国公民入境。民航局也在3月 29 日减少了航线，要求每个航空公司每个国家每周只保留一个航班。

“预防外国人”阴差阳错地成为了预防外来疫情的最明显对象。虽然北京3月复工，但我的一位美国籍编辑朋友却无法回到办公室，因为写字楼的物业不再让外国人进入。英国《卫报》的记者 Lily Kuo 在推特上写道，在入住上海一家酒店时，她因持有美国护照被拒绝入住，虽近期并无美国旅行历史。个别人士对防疫法律的不遵守，也让“洋垃圾”这类论述再次浮出水面。这些经历不只是单独的案例，而是对外国居民污名化可见的激增。

像其它国家的种族歧视一样，最严重的受害者往往是有色人种。在非洲裔人口密集的广州市，一家麦当劳门店写出英文告示，明确禁止黑人进入餐厅。该餐厅随后因压力道歉。据英国广播电台报道，大量非洲裔广州居民被无故强制检测，有些被放进隔离酒店并被房东驱逐。有居民表示，房产中介也拒绝出租给非洲人，导致不少人流落街头。虽然中国中央政府否认针对种族的区别对待，但这些令人不安的遭遇导致非洲数个国家政府召见中国大使，更是受到了非盟主席穆萨•法基的谴责。美国驻华大使馆也发布提示，警告非洲裔美国公民避免访穗。据《金融时报》报道，非洲部分国家在华外交官签署联名信，向中国外交部门表示抗议。

值得提出的是，这类歧视在中国的盛行也加剧了海外中国人面对的阻力，同时也伤害了中国的国家形象。仅仅在非洲就有近100万中国公民，且随着中企在当地越来越多的投资、中非合作的紧密，这个数字还在不断增加。多个非洲国家网民在推特上将矛头指向当地华人，用 “#ChinaGoHome”、“#ChinaMustExplain” 等标签挑起反华情绪。肯尼亚国会议员摩西•库里亚（Moses Kuria）甚至借此机会提议遣返在肯中国公民。与此同时，中国多年来努力建设的国家形象也将因此在世界局部破裂，而这种负面影响与矛盾也将反射到海外不少华人身上。

国内民众对“外来”面孔的恐惧和歧视，不免让我联想到在西方许多种族歧视者的愚昧。当然，这场疫情并不是中国排外主义和种族歧视的第一次展现。从 2016 年“俏比洗衣溶珠”事件，到 2018 年央视春晚“涂黑脸”（blackface）丑闻，再到近期外国人居留条例的改革，中文社交媒体上的主流观点似乎充满了沙文主义色彩和种族主义偏见。虽然不少人拒绝承认这些偏见存在的现实，但它们在这次疫情污名化的过程中凸显出来。

疫情期间在美国几个月里，我经常收到国内朋友、家人关切的讯息，怕我因亚洲面孔受到不公对待甚至是歧视性的暴力。我从未因为亚洲面孔被餐厅拒绝服务或被酒店拒绝入住，但这种恐惧也让我更容易地用同理心看待中国今天的一些排外主义情绪。事实上，官方数据显示，大多数境外输入疫情都来自以留学生为主的中国公民，外国护照持有者只占很小一部分。和中国人在美国的境况类似，新的入境政策已经导致外国公民无法进入中国，更没法像很多人想的那样将病毒带到国内。我3月中旬回到北京，比绝大多数在华长居的外国人携带病毒的风险高得多。

在这次疫情之中，恐惧心理超越了理性。排外现象里，虽然部分是一些政府部门的决策，但更常见的是民众和企业为“多一事不如少一事”而自作主张。一位加拿大好友在北京东直门一家商店被拒绝进入时，店主声称是上级规定。一个考虑不周的决定，可能会给他人带来数倍的困扰与麻烦。他打电话给当地政府，只得知没有这种要求，并让他下次遭遇类似情况时联络警察。其实，如果想要降低风险，与其通过肤色和国籍决断，不如参照近期的旅行历史，对中国人、外国人一视同仁——多问一个问题，增加一点信任，也许没有那么难。

己所不欲，勿施于人。在新冠病毒袭击全球的如今，别让排外情绪向病毒一样侵蚀我们的社会。

如若恰巧路过土耳其的话，推荐大家去趟加里波利。

钟俊峰先生的作品，刘派。

应景儿

https://www.ft.com/content/48f199b0-9054-4ab6-aaad-a326163c9285

shame, shame, shame...

试试

上下集

欧盟在新冠疫情危机期间的表现，让意大利的亲欧派都感到心寒，后者越来越觉得本国正被邻国抛弃。

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001087122

不知这场疫情最终会带来一个集权统一的欧盟还是一个离散瓦解的欧盟？

一直以为是南京大学之前去世了的高华教授……百思不得其解。 这个缩写从什么时候开始有的？

'The moral debate is not lives vs money. It is lives vs lives. It will take months, perhaps years, if ever, before we can assess the wider implications of what we are doing. The damage to children’s education, the excess suicides, the increase in mental health problems, the taking away of resources from other health problems that we were dealing with effectively. Those who need medical help now but won’t seek it, or might not be offered it. And what about the effects on food production and global commerce, that will have unquantifiable consequences for people of all ages, perhaps especially in developing economies?

Governments everywhere say they are responding to the science. The policies in the UK are not the government’s fault. They are trying to act responsibly based on the scientific advice given. But governments must remember that rushed science is almost always bad science. We have decided on policies of extraordinary magnitude without concrete evidence of excess harm already occurring, and without proper scrutiny of the science used to justify them.

In the next few days and weeks, we must continue to look critically and dispassionately at the Covid-19 evidence as it comes in. Above all else, we must keep an open mind — and look for what is, not for what we fear might be.'

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/The-evidence-on-Covid-19-is-not-as-clear-as-we-think

'因此中国这次实际上将面临两个前景：要么通过中国已经掌握的稀缺医疗物资、医疗经验和共同开发疫苗，努力援助世界抗疫和公共卫生工作，并借此树立自己世界领袖之形象；要么就是被境外媒体和政客炒作成两次世界瘟疫传播者形象。中国国内政治稳定也会同样被波及。

中国应该用主动与美国领导人对话的方式结束此轮中美博弈，争取前一种前景。'

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001086984?page1

Here's a health unto his Majesty

viva la nostra Siena

la più bella delle città

自省 23333

There was a touch of schadenfreude as I heard that Britain has followed France, Italy and several other European countries in locking down. In the last week or so there have been a number of articles about how Britain would never impose on its people the draconian measures taken by Emmanuel Macron and others because their countries, unlike ours, have a history of authoritarian government.

Boris Johnson was admirable in his wish to avoid locking down the country but the indiscipline of millions of his people left him no choice. Boris can't be blamed for the packed pubs last week, the teeming parks at the weekend or the street barbecues this week. Nor can he take the rap for the stripping of supermarket shelves up and down the country, a phenomenon which in Europe is unique to Britain. It may be connected with the fact that a WHO report in 2018 stated that we Brits are the third most obese nation in Europe (after Malta and Turkey) and the 'world champions' for alcohol consumption. These are two factors, incidentally, which won't stand us in good stead in the battle against coronavirus.

No one better symbolises the obstreperous British than Joanne Rust, whose antics have gone viral after she was filmed being dragged out of a Tenerife pool having refused to obey the hotel's lockdown. You wouldn't expect such irresponsible behaviour from a 13-year-old, let alone a 53-year-old Labour councillor.

There are cases in France of youths – mainly those on estates controlled by drug gangs or Islamists – flagrantly breaching the country's strict lockdown laws. But overall, people are doing as instructed with good cheer and an impressive esprit de corps. Each evening at 8pm across France, millions stand at their windows clapping and cheering in a show of support for medical workers.

Meanwhile in Britain, youths have slashed the tyres of ambulances, stolen oxygen canisters and reportedly even spat at police officers attending an accident. One day into Britain's lockdown and already police chiefs are warning that such a crisis is likely to bring out 'the worst in humanity and there will be individuals who seek to exploit the pandemic'.

British youth have a well-deserved reputation for being among the rowdiest in Europe. Whether it's gangs of feral yobs running riot in town centres or legions of school leavers fighting, vomiting and copulating their way across the Greek and Balearic islands each summer

But it's not the kids' fault, so much as the parents. As I've written before in The Spectator, specifically about the reason why British children are generally fatter than their French counterparts, millions of British mums and dads haven't the first clue about child-rearing. To them, being a good parent is about being a 'good mate' to their offspring.

Most popular Ross Clark Why is the coronavirus mortality rate so much lower in Germany? Why is the coronavirus mortality rate so much lower in Germany?Why is the coronavirus mortality rate so much lower in Germany? In 2008, the Association of School and College Leaders first brought attention to a generation of ill-mannered and indisciplined children who had been failed by their parents. As a result, schools were obliged to teach not just reading, writing and arithmetic but also ' basic social skills'. The warning went unheeded, however, and a 2016 report by a schools support service made for alarming reading. One dismayed school leader was quoted asking 'why, in the 21st century are children still arriving in school nurseries aged three or above without being toilet trained?'

The French – and most European countries – are better at parenting than the British because they're more, well, grown-up about the whole business.

Arguably no other country in the last half a century has undergone such a wholescale transformation of its national character than the British. As Rod Liddle wrote in his 2014 book, Selfish Whining Monkeys, a people once admired around the world for their stiff upper lip now 'suffer from a reversal of the sort of stoicism manifested in the previous generation'. Witness the panic-buying of loo rolls, when, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, never in the field of human conflict was so much bought by so many.

It's reported that the police have been instructed to use persuasion rather than punishment to enforce the lockdown, but such a noble policy is unlikely to work on the nation that has become the slack man of Europe.

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/why-does-britain-lack-the-lockdown-discipline-of-france-

Prince Charles tests positive but 'remains in good health'

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-52033845

希望来得及。

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/coronavirus-you-must-stay-at-home-6rjwndr0c

rt

https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=657429&remap=gb

写论文必备, 旁边一瓶Vodka, 保你思如泉涌。

兩年前的今天，你卸下一切的渴望、一切的悵愁、一切的怨怒、一切的快意恩仇，喘了最後一口氣，停了。

每個人都在等待我悼念你的文章。但我遲遲未動筆。

你對生命的失望，表現在孤獨的喪禮儀式中。你討厭儀式，但居然選擇「一燒了之，其他隨便」。

我沒有趕去見你最後一面，雖然你的最後一程路，我探了好幾回。

為什麼？

因為我不想告別。

我的記憶，當你揮手時，你仍想像自己是麥克阿瑟，老兵不死，只是凋零。我不想看到比凋零還孱弱的你。

此刻東風依舊，那年的你卻已全然幾近殘滅了。

永遠的巨人，被時代拋棄也被時代排擠的獨立人格，絕不趨炎，絕不附勢。抓著你的筆尖，你和一切對抗。對抗領袖、對抗威權、對抗俗媚、對抗虛假、對抗沈淪的自由，沈淪的言論泛濫。對抗拘押你的上一代，不屈遺忘你的下一代。

於是青壯時的你一個人對抗整個時代，轟轟烈烈：晚年的你一個人孤寂守在書房，寧願守在浩瀚的資料堆中。空氣始終泛著霉味，正如你你最後冷眼、心寒，什麼都變了調的當代。

這樣的時代，你已沒有什麼留戀了。它不值得你書寫，不值得你為誰再喊話。當年的你振筆疾書，寫下「為老兵李師科喊話」，一篇動搖國本的文章。猶記每個報社的主管者都曾對此文嘆為觀止，「什麼人寫得過他？」，可是無人敢刊登。

你是那個時代真正的野火，但李大哥，野火燒不盡 ，春風吹又生。解除戒嚴後的春風，你分不到桂冠，桂冠永遠屬於更懂得和時代妥協的人：文人、政治人、商人。

你必須目睹新的時代如何追捧冒然崛起的大財富家，演藝人員，歌手。而你，所有的創作，在這樣庸俗的年代，最膾炙人口的居然是：不看你的眼，不看你的眉，看了心裡都是你，忘了我是誰。⋯⋯

時間年復一年的在前進，於是你開始了另一段「老頑童」式的新人生。

凌遲是中國遼宋以後死刑的文化，盡量使人臨前求生不能求死不得的文化。身為中國自由主義的信仰者，也可能是身體力行最後一位知識份子。你忽而質問擁抱狗仔綜藝的時代：「這就是你們回報我們坐穿牢底換來的言論自由嗎？」年輕人報之以嘲笑，蔑視你內心的沈痛。多數時刻你乾脆也加入嘻笑怒罵的文化，用你的機智、你的風采、開口閉口威脅「小心收到我的律師信」，大伙兒哄堂大笑，你逗著這個看起來熱鬧，其實無聊透頂的後戒嚴年代。臉上帶著笑，瀟灑一揮，心中留下太多的悲與愴。

你著作等身，卻沒有一篇文字被收入教科書內。是不值嗎？當然不是。「北京法源寺」曾經被提名進入諾貝爾文學獎，那是台灣作家惟一一次的殊榮。

但你的文字那麼令人不安，你搓破了太多口號，你嘲笑了太多人們根深蒂固擁抱的意識形態，從「中華民國，早就亡國了」，從「反攻大陸是假的」到「台獨也是假的」。

你怒斥一切，你痛恨統治者用謊言、用集體意識的包裝奴役老百姓。你相信自由主義的前提，人們可以也必須擁有獨立思考的空間。所有的意識形態都是霸權，它宰制人，也切割個人的價值和臉孔。

於是曾經在你的「北京法源寺」中，描述悲壯的犧牲者「那張臉已被刀割得血肉模糊，但是輪廓還在」，「在月光下，全身被刀割得沒有完膚，四肢也全斷了」，它寓言了後來的你自己。你的輪廓還在，但你衷心相信的自由主義已經沒有完膚，四肢也全斷了。自由主義換上了戲裝，不拉嗓，跳起踢踏舞，跳起大腿舞，一轉身，露出脊涼的背部，啊，又是一個「新時代，新口號，新暢銷的謊言。」

親愛的李大哥，你和受你思想影響甚深的我，那麼死腦筋信賴自由主義，但它是一個烏托邦，它從來不曾在地球上任何一塊土地實踐過。在五四運動時，它是被民族主義包裝的口號：在台灣，它是反抗蔣家權威的有利工具：在英國，它只曾經存在於英國下議院偶爾的時光。

我們那麼相信人應該擁有獨立思考的天賦人權，可是民主政體的實驗結果，人們並不想望如此的人權。他們更渴望一個可以包裹心靈的熱情意識形態，使他們可以呼喊，使他們可以流淚，使虛弱的他們，感覺自己挺挺地「站起來」，幻想自己可以成為「巨人」，錯覺自己參與了時代。人，太渺小，他們獨立不了：人，太脆弱，他們怕離開集體。人，太奴性，他們永遠需要一套統治者為他們設計的價值體系，從公衆到私人行為。每踏出一步，人都得那麼小心翼翼。就怕萬一落了單，成為衆矢之的。所以人性那麼需要盲流，那麼容易被帶領，被欺騙，被文化革命，被宣傳，被洪流淹沒。

親愛的李大哥，是時代辜負了你？還是我們始終誤解了時代？

你走了以後，我更寂寞，更少評論時事。「你怎麼可以拆穿那麼多人的夢？」這是殷海光於「自由中國雜誌」上撰寫「反攻無望論」之後，被逐出台大哲學系，一位長者告訴殷海光的話。

有好幾回我們一起走在陽明山古道上，倆個人眺望遠方的基隆河，它蜿蜒，我們靜默。你輕輕地説：「文茜，講真話，要付出代價的。」河水像一條帶子，那些曾經説真話的，沒有烽火，也要骨肉離散。在東風吹襲中，多少人曾經為一些夢想，揉進了辛酸與涕淚。

一切修短隨化，終期於盡。我們各柱一個㭭杖，同一家牌子，沒有嘆息。靜靜地看著山，看著萬家燈火，知道自己年輕的夢想，已歸於烏有。

「他戎馬一生，到頭來一無所有，他既不能養兒防老，又不能獲得任何退休金，他的老境，是註定要堪憐的。現在的困苦，都沒有人理他；將來的死活，又有誰理他呢？現在尚有能力謀生，都拮据如此；將來更老了，又怎麼度餘年呢？這種沒有安全感，在他也是與日俱增。

要退伍不讓退，要出境不讓走，困苦、怨恨、沒有安全感，每一項原因都是合理的、正常的，都構成一個老兵的抗議，都構成一個公民的抗議，都構成一個人的抗議。

沒有這種抗議，人還叫人麼？ 」

這是你為一個義賊、最後被槍斃的老兵李師科寫下的文字。

「沒有這種抗議，人還叫人麼？」

但天上的李大哥，你現在在更高處，比我們當時站的山頂還高。你看得更清了，這個世界，多數的人選擇不要當你定義中的人。

人，是苟且的，不是抗議的。

人，是偷生，不是坦蕩蕩活著的。

人是做不了自己，只能模仿他人，模仿那些社會樹立的樣板人物。

於是幾十年來，不只是老兵李師科，不只是他的生與死，他的愛與恨，他的委曲與耿直，他的汗斑與淚痕，沒人在乎。一把槍，斃了，徹底殺掉了真正底層抗議的聲音。他們殺死了李師科還不夠，還要眾口爍金，徹底淹沒他們的愛與恨。他們那些沒有死的老兵，沒有抗議的老兵，現在守著當年微薄的退休金，被抗議了。

美國文學家休伍德（Robert Emmet Sherwood）寫《化石森林》（Th Petraified Forest）寫那個窮苦文人斯魁爾（Alan Squrier），甘願請強盜殺死他，為了死後可領五千保險金，送給他心愛的女孩，幫她離開沙漠，去過好日子；法國文學家雨果（Vuctor Mrie Hugo）寫《悲慘世界》（Les Miserables），寫那個砍樹枝的窮苦工人尚萬近（Jean Vlean），甘願坐長年大牢，為了養育他姐姐的七個小孩，而偷一個麵包。

這些動人的故事，皆成為文學經典。

可是你撰寫的「為李師科喊話」，以前被查禁，後來被遺忘。它沒有成為經典，因為不只李師科是弱勢，他還是弱勢中的非主流。而撰寫文章的李敖，太咄咄逼人，逼著當年政權趕緊消滅他的聲音，後來也因為撰寫此文的李敖對他的祖國仍有幻想，政治太不正確，一切不可以成為經典。

「此水本自清，是誰攪令濁？」

終究在我們親眼目睹時代的變化後，無形的子彈也飛向我們，「千千萬萬的李師科」不只沒有出現，他們還是舊政權的千千萬萬的俘虜。不需要手銬，沒有抓伕。他們心甘情願，走在領袖創立的黨後面：或許時而為你曾經的真話鼓掌，更多時候討厭你搓破「千千萬萬人的夢。」

你走了，所有曾經與你有關的幾乎都化為塵土。你已躺下，台灣再無戰士。

在春天的寒風中，我再度悲愴的走在古道上。佇立著，一個人。

我也逐漸走上衰老之路，不只外表，更多的是內心。沒有人再為你的思想而傾倒，但你留下的輕輕細語，「講真話是要付出代價的！」對我仍舊如雷貫耳。

別人可以遺忘你，我不會。對我而言，我們共同擁抱的自由主義信念是長遠的，永恆的。它是烏托邦，但它使我們活得與衆人如此不同。

李大哥，這個時代配不上你，你屬於大時代。

這個時代也不配向你再會，而是你向我們道別。

向我們一代一代道別。

比起短暫的人生，你對我而言是長遠的，你帶我走進歷史，也走出歷史。我們不必強求改變充滿奴役的人性，但我們不可以成為人云亦云，附合趨勢的人。

相識也相知四十年，過去我把信念存寄在你身上，挫折的時候，偶爾靠在你身邊，我總是很快重新得到了力量。現在我依然把信念佇寄於你，藉由思念，讓自己活得更坦然。

這正是我不想告別的理由。

勤洗手，讲卫生

https://www.ft.com/content/0a1ba80c-434c-11ea-9a2a-98980971c1ff

对拉丁国家的爱还是胜过安格鲁-撒克逊国家。

上下卷

{http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=b0c9eca0f53fbca7af7119eb25f302ea} {http://gen.lib.rus.ec/book/index.php?md5=99419effbe89cdc262a70ee60602ec4b}

"Liberté, Egalité"

Tu arrobbe a me, io arrobbo a te.

高等卫生研究院ISS说很有可能是个伊朗人在伊朗感染的。

https://news-town.it/cronaca/29048-coronavirus,-l-iss-l-epidemia-in-italia-non-%C3%A8-arrivata-dalla-cina.html

意大利全境红区了

https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2020/03/09/news/coronavirus_situazione_italia-250756249/

文化部长感染了

https://www.capital.fr/economie-politique/le-ministre-franck-riester-teste-positif-au-coronavirus-1364294

《卫报》旧文

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/10/in-praise-of-cynicism

rt

我看欧洲这边的卫生机构大多不建议没有症状的市民佩戴口罩。 也不建议医生和服务业人员佩戴口罩，以免造成恐慌。

另外不知疫情会不会影响到复活节假期。

如题

http://www.xinfajia.net/16054.html

RT

Saltatio mortis

这篇好像没有paywall.

游天龙：新冠病毒成为全球化时代第一次从世界体系中心向边缘国家和地区发散开来的全球性疫情，其影响可能超预期。

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001086122

BREAKING: Lakers legend Kobe Bryant, 41, is killed in Calabasas helicopter crash along with four others onboard

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7931909/Kobe-Bryant-dies-Calabasas-helicopter-crash.html

陆大鹏旧文

https://www.douban.com/note/681308197/

感觉这首被Dandelion那首盖过去了

让我重拾保守主义信念的Roger Scruton爵士于上周日去世了。 特此转发一段访谈以表怀念。 Sir Roger Scruton: How To Be A Conservative https://www.hoover.org/research/how-be-conservative