顶

可用伏特加代水

当地时间5月25日，美国明尼苏达州明尼阿波利斯市街头，46岁的非洲裔司机乔治.弗洛伊德因被无端怀疑购物时使用了一张20美元假钞，遭德雷克.肖万等4名警察暴力对待，最终不治身亡。

以此为导火索，自当地时间5月26日以来，抗议示威在包括首都华盛顿在内，美国全境众多城镇不断爆发，愈演愈烈，尽管包括遇难者家属在内的许多人呼吁“和平抗争”，但事态仍很快在多地演变为骚乱。

众所周知，作为新冠肺炎疫情冲击最严重、累计确诊数和总死亡人数双双高居全球第一的“重灾区”，美国社会本就在“抗疫”和“重启”两难中挣扎彷徨、左右为难。如今一波未平，一波又起，如燎原烈火般旬日间燃遍全国的暴力、骚乱，无疑令美国社会雪上加霜。正如许多媒体、评论家所言，无论任何理由，都不能成为挑起和实施骚乱、煽动并纵容暴力的借口。

人是有记忆的高级动物。目睹此情此景，不免让人联想到曾几何时，当香港街头爆发骚乱、动荡时，个别美国政要令人瞩目的言论。如民主党籍众院议长南希·佩洛西，去年6月就曾盛赞香港示威是“一道美丽的风景线”，是“争取民主和法治的非暴力示威”，并将香港街头的激进分子称作“勇士”。

如今似曾相识的一幕在美国各地街头重演，且规模、“烈度”有过之无不及。不知目睹这一切的佩洛西等政要，会否也将这些激进暴力行为视作“争取民主和法治的非暴力示威”，将带头打砸烧抢的激进分子称作“勇士”？是否也会饱蘸激情地讴歌这一道道出现在本土和身边的“美丽风景线”？

佩洛西显然不会这么认为。她说，“这真是一场悲剧。这是一种犯罪。”“它伤透了你们的心。它真的伤透了你们的心。这太令人悲伤。但必须要有，必须要有人被绳之以法。”显然，当本国与他国面临类似的暴乱时，佩洛西采取了“双标”的评价，这不是一个人道主义的做法。

今年是美国的选举年，在朝在野的政党、政客，都苦心孤诣地试图从一切突发事件中得到“选举收益”，包括揽功于己，诿过于人，也包括竭力将自己塑造为群体事件众多参与者的“知心人”、“自己人”，将政治对手映射为“对立面”、“肇事者”，目的无非争取更多投向自己的选票。此番“弗洛伊德事件”爆发至今，美国朝野两党照样将这一“常规套路”耍得很熟。但事实证明，随着事态的恶化、暴力的升级和骚乱的蔓延，被骚乱、暴力波及的方方面面和每个人，都无一例外变成了受害者。

从这个角度来看，持续多时的香港骚乱、暴力已严重伤害当地社会秩序、经济、就业和民生，伤害到每一个相关方面和相关者，这充分证明了一个铁的事实：骚乱和暴力何时何地都绝不会是“一道美丽的风景线”。如今，“弗洛伊德事件”所引发的美国各地骚乱、暴力，再次雄辩地证明了这个铁一般的事实。

“己所不欲，勿施于人”，将心比心，我们既然不愿在香港等本国领土上出现导致每个人都受到伤害、损失的骚乱、暴力，自然也不愿这样的骚乱、暴力、伤害和损失，发生在任何国家、任何社会、任何人身上，这当然也包括美国——因此，我们并没有打算幸灾乐祸，也没有欢呼大洋彼岸“亮丽风景线”的意图。

我们只是珍惜本国领土上的和平、安宁和稳定，只是希望在同样遭遇骚乱、暴力伤害后，大洋彼岸的人们能理解、尊重，或起码正视我们这种愿景的正当性，我们更希望，中国香港也好，美国华盛顿或明尼阿波利斯也罢，地球上每个角落，都不再被骚乱、暴力所侵袭困扰，更希望任何地方、任何时间、由任何人挑起和实施的骚乱、暴力，都不会被任何方面以任何理由，再涂抹上“亮丽风景线”之类的“伪装色”。

□李厚何（专栏作者）

编辑 胡博阳 实习生 张晓雨 校对 何燕 http://www.bjnews.com.cn/opinion/2020/05/31/733318.html

当初回归的时候就应该给。对北京对港人都有好处。

@爱狗却养猫 #19 世家是精英阶层的中流砥柱。

故有君道焉有父道焉有子道焉夫唱而妇随兄友而弟恭莫不有叙人伦正也上不可以逼下下不得以僭上大不可以凌小小不可以加大无得而逾尊卑定也朝廷邦国乡党遂序有典有则有伦有节有条而不紊贵贱别也天下有万不同之情先王同之于一堂之上薄海内外虽愚夫愚妇莫敢以私智侧言改度易制者以分定故也夫人伦正尊卑定贵贱别则分守明分守明则人志一人志一而好作乱者未之有也下不好乱上无僭差而天下不治者亦未之有也

@张怀义 #3 投机倒把，倒买倒卖，跟发国倒儿爷接头去来着。

别人的博客

http://chuangcn.org/2019/10/baffled-beijingers/

Here we publish an intake submitted by a reader who lives in Beijing. The piece provides detailed insights into how a certain group of mainland white-collar workers view the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, and how their understanding has been shaped over the past few months. The reality described by this piece is disappointing, as reality often tends to be. Our goal in publishing it is, however, not to dash any optimism against the sharp rocks of the real world, but instead to point out that the only hope worth having is one that can traverse this deadly, disappointing terrain with optimism in hand. This can only be done through a rigorous, empirical investigation of our present reality.

What hope does this piece offer for directions forward? Those of us living in China often feel similarly hopeless, despite the fact that we regularly interact with the country’s tiny minority of leftists and labor activists who hold views that are at least broadly in line with our own. However, the past few years of repression (most recently targeting leftists and labor organizations, following on the heels of similar crackdowns against feminists and others) has narrowed this space substantially, cutting us off from the already small handful of friends with whom we felt any sort of political camaraderie. At the same time, those who remain are probably more representative of the broader masses of Chinese workers — whether white collar, blue or pink — than the more outward-oriented leftists who suffered worst in the crackdowns. Among those remaining, the college-educated office personnel of Beijing who are highlighted in this piece would be expected to be an exception: they are the Chinese citizens who have VPNs (or did until increased censorship recently blocked most of them), regularly criticize the CCP and have historically been sympathetic to Hong Kong liberalism. But the conversations cited below reveal that this position has become far more complex in response to the anti-extradition movement, pushing some of these erstwhile liberal or otherwise apolitical women and men toward a position that is solidly nationalist, anti-democratic and in favor of wide-ranging repressive measures.

We will explore this phenomenon in more detail in a forthcoming intake about the rise and solidification of a new Chinese nationalist right over the past year, in response to the trade war as well as the anti-extradition movement, especially among college students. The account below mainly reflects the situation of white-collar workers in Beijing, centered on those who imagine themselves relatively cosmopolitan, liberal and critical of the CCP.

–Chuang

When thousands first took to the streets in Hong Kong against the extradition bill in early June, few of the 1.3 billion people to the north in the mainland would have known. Social media controls blocked most posts related to the Hong Kong protests, and state media outlets did not publish a word on sensitive situation in the city. But much has changed since then. Now, not a day goes by without China’s central television blasting footage of fire in the streets of Hong Kong, and police press conferences citing the number of arrests in each day’s demonstrations. At first, when there was no news about Hong Kong in the mainland, I wished friends here – at least those who, like most people, have no access to VPNs to reach beyond the Great Firewall – could hear about what was happening in Hong Kong. Now that state media has whipped the country into a nationalistic fervor to defend “national unity,” I long for the days of the media blackout.

State media was put in an awkward position by the outbreak of protests in Hong Kong. When the first reports broke, mass protests appeared to have happened out of the blue, bewildering many of my friends here in Beijing. Weeks of silence had left mainlanders without any background on the situation until the first reports appeared in state media in mid-June. They missed the introduction of the extradition bill by the Hong Kong government in February, and the rallies and public debate about the bill that developed into the summer. There were still no reports when hundreds of thousands were on the streets demanding the withdrawal of the extradition bill on June 9th, or when bean bag rounds flew and tear gas billowed around the Legislative Council building on June 12th. Then on June 13th Xinhua ran its first major article, entitled “The Majority of Hongkongers Support the ‘Extradition Bill’, Avoid Hong Kong Becoming a ‘Fugitive’s Paradise.’” The article was forced to recount the background of the protest movement that, until then, had not been covered by mainland press. The article spoke of the Hong Kong man who murdered a woman in Taiwan, and the months of preparations by the Hong Kong government to amend its laws to allow him to be extradited to the mainland. It did not tell of the months of smaller scale demonstrations against the bill, or local discussions warning of discontent, but the Xinhua post did cite a petition started in April by pro-mainland group “Safeguard Hong Kong”, which claimed to have the signatures 900,000 Hongkongers supporting the bill.

Xinhua and other state media were hard pressed to explain, then, why 2 million Hongkongers, in a city of just 7 million people, took to the streets against the bill later that week, on June 16th. Just before the planned demonstrations that day, mainland papers ran a statement from the mainland government’s Hong Kong Liason Office, warning of “foreign forces interfering in Hong Kong,” a ridiculous claim. Though foreign governments and intelligence agencies were no doubt on the scene, and regularly met with political leaders like Joshua Wong, or funded top political leaders in the “democracy movement” like Benny Tai, they clearly could not mobilize a third of the city’s population, nor direct the “black mobs” to clash with the hated police – “raptors” who swooped in to drag off protesters by the dozens, or infiltrated demonstrations dressed as protestors, or allowed mainland security forces to operate within police ranks.[1]

News and pictures of the mass marches still trickled through, circulated on WeChat and other social media, and I recall some of my mainland friends supporting protesters in Hong Kong, and thinking it a shame that Beijing had so quickly eroded barriers between the city and the mainland. In June there was still ample evidence that many mainlanders who sympathized with Hong Kong were skirting censorship to show their support. But these more sympathetic interpretations and sentiments were quickly drowned out by the escalating propaganda campaign. Social media controls tightened, and the Hong Kong protests slowly became a daily news item. Mainland officials had to put together a common message. A line was quickly drawn to single out the “violent” and “extreme” protesters, who were allegedly incited by “hostile foreign forces,” mainly the US (though China also publicly lashed out at the EU, UK, Germany and other foreign governments who issued statements against police violence).

The narrative, however, remained a bit confusing, and mainland coverage continued to be viewed by some of my friends as suspicious and incoherent. One asked, for example, if protests were mostly by a few violent extremists in the financial and political centers on Hong Kong island, why were there so many reports of police arrests (which mainland news published with relish) throughout Kowloon and the more rural parts of the New Territories in the north? Were the extremists organized in cells throughout the city? Or were the protests larger than CCTV reported? Of course, many mainland friends are perfectly aware of state censorship, and know that the outlets may be telling half truths at best when it comes to politically sensitive issues. But without readily available alternatives, the confusion only seemed to accumulate, as the situation in Hong Kong itself continued to develop and become more complex day by day.

The storming of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council building on July 1st shocked another friend in Beijing. After watching clips of the footage circulating online, she was beside herself with confusion and disbelief. “I thought Hongkongers were peaceful people,” she said. “What has made them so angry and violent? I guess the rumors of foreign influence must be true. Why would they do this?” Few in the mainland would have had access to coverage of events like these, or they would have been able to read inside stories detailing how a group of young Hongkongers voted to storm the building in a Telegram chat without much prior planning, just as many of the protest actions are decided: collectively, on mobile chat platforms.

Mainlanders watching the news would have difficulty understanding the role of Beijing in the intransigent government, which has both supported, but also hamstrung Carrie Lam – along with her government and police force – by forcing them to maintain an absolute hardline on protests. Mainlanders may have caught the Global Times report denouncing an explosive leaked speech by Lam to a group of businesspeople as “fake news.” Lam explained rather candidly to the group that “if she had a choice”, she would quit. “The room, the political room for the chief executive who, unfortunately, has to serve two masters by constitution, that is the central people’s government and the people of Hong Kong, that political room for maneuvering is very, very, very limited,” said Lam. Hong Kong government sources also revealed to Reuters, which is blocked in the mainland, that the central government had blocked a move by Hong Kong’s leaders to give concessions to protesters and withdraw the extradition bill at least a month before Lam’s government’s official withdrawal in early September.

This may have even been a unilateral move by Lam, the only one of the “five demands” her government could stomach as a bone thrown to protestors or to calm the business elite, though it’s difficult to tell. Many Hong Kong capitalists had long seen the extradition law, and perhaps the broader encroachment of Beijing on their exclusive domain, as “bad for business”. Money flowed to Singapore and other markets as the government pressed forward with the bill. The other demands – like the release of the hundreds of arrested protesters, or an independent enquiry into police violence – would have only mattered to the people of Hong Kong, were politically costly to the government, and didn’t cost business a dime either way. Lam could not, and would not, resign, and universal suffrage would be too costly – quite literally – for the city, as outlined by her predecessor CY Leung: “If it’s entirely a numbers game and numeric representation, then obviously you’d be talking to the half of the people in Hong Kong who earn less than US$1,800 a month [HK$13,964.2],” he said in an interview in 2014. Lam could, of course, be frank with business leaders, while she continued to lie through her teeth to the public, and send more (increasingly militarized) police at protesters.

Tensions – between Hong Kong and the mainland, and within the city itself – came to a head on China’s National Day on October 1st. Carrie Lam partied in Beijing while the city erupted in protest and an 18 year old protester was shot point blank in the chest by a police officer. Of course no news of the protests blared on CCTV that day, only the orgy of militarism and national pride. Xi Jinping did, however, make one reference to Hong Kong in his short speech at the opening of the military parade, saying that China must adhere to the “one country, two systems” policy, just before miles of soldiers, tanks, missiles and drones rolled down Chang’an Street and past Tiananmen Square. My colleagues watched with pride and pleasure, except for one, who is from Hong Kong. She spent the evening in tears. Having watched the footage of the young man shot in the streets of Hong Kong on loop all afternoon, the boom of the fireworks at night in Beijing were too much for her to bear.

It is now clear that many of my friends and colleagues who once kept an open mind about protests, or were perhaps only curious about the novel mass protests, are decidedly on the side of the central government against Hong Kong. What I have found particularly alarming is the loss of any sense of subtlety, or desire to understand the intricacies of the situation. Some have clamped down hard on easy to understand, pithy ideas. I hear them say things like: “well, Hongkongers have decided on independence, so they have all crossed the line. They are beyond reason.” Many of my friends have often been openly critical of the CCP in the past, and stray from the party line on any number of controversial issues, like Xinjiang’s camps, or the ever-expanding police state, with its Great Firewall and surveillance cameras on every street corner. Recently, however, at least on Hong Kong, it seems that when push comes to shove, some have retreated to a sort of raw nationalism, defending some idea of Chinese-ness. The desecration of symbols like Chinese national flags, or the booing at the Chinese national anthem quickly became topics of discussion at the office water cooler, as they were circulated widely on WeChat. “The mistake these Hongkongers make is that they forget they are Chinese. They are becoming racist, and hateful of their own homeland, and that is just unacceptable,” said one. Of course, examples of rising hatred against Hong Kongers in the mainland were not circulated on WeChat, like the beating of a Hong Kong hockey club at a tournament in Shenzhen, after they won over a mainland opponent. “I think the only way out of this situation is for Hong Kong to be returned to China a second time,” said another, referring to the 1997 handover of the city, a former colony of Britain.

I grant that these may be the views of a few privileged elite in the capital, who, as a habit, read and discuss the news about Hong Kong, or the US-China trade war, or conflicts in the Middle East, largely for sport. It cannot be said to reflect the views of the average mainlander, from the coast to the inland provinces, or the rural to urban migrant. At least around me, however, the state narrative seems to have taken a firm hold after these months, moving from silence to a full-blown propaganda war. Combined with censorship and a clampdown on independent conversations, it has taken firm hold on the hearts and minds of many who would more naturally be more sympathetic observers. While the current situation among my colleagues seems bleak, it is also clear that if citizens had greater access to information, the cost to the state would indeed be heavy. At the least, it would make it harder for many like my colleagues to fall into narrative of the state, which is undying allegiance to the state, the party, and the idea of the Chinese people in a time of crisis: As the March of the Volunteers, the national anthem, proclaims: “The Chinese nation is now facing its greatest danger. Everyone must let out one last cry. Arise! Arise! Arise! We millions are of one heart. Brave the enemies’ gunfire! March on!”

–Bob, a reader based in Beijing

October 7th, 2019

人民什么都不知道呀，怎么能让人民决定呢？

@张怀义 #1 吾弟近来无恙？

你们这不对，应该是：

预防腐败室，预防预防腐败室腐败室，预防预防预防腐败室腐败室腐败室。

'我爱大清国，怕它完了！’

按：新冠病毒疫情下东亚裔在美国受到的歧视增多，而中国国内歧视外国人的现象也加剧了海外中国人面对的阻力。

http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001087382?page=1

今年年初，中国全国的新冠病毒疫情正式爆发。随着特朗普政府对华关闭边境，我和其他在美国的华人取消了回中国探亲的计划；不少回乡庆祝春节的人滞留在国内，无法回到校园和办公室里。

在为家人朋友的健康、安全担忧的同时，我们还为在太平洋彼岸自己的境况焦虑。虽然美国并未限制中国公民入境，但不少华人取消了短期出国的计划，怕因为护照上的出生地引起不必要的麻烦。当“中国”成为了新冠病毒的代名词，东亚裔在全美受到了各种各样的歧视。旧金山州立大学的研究表示，仅在1月28日至2月24日之间就有超过1000起针对亚裔的种族歧视案件。从社交媒体上传播的视频中不难发现，这其中不少甚至涉及到了暴力行为。在法国，华人们举着 “我不是病毒（Je ne suis pas un virus）”的牌子，在社交媒体上发声。食客们也开始避免亚洲餐厅，让华人区的中餐馆生意备受打击。

身在美国，我自己在人群密集的场所也一直避免佩戴口罩，以免引起不必要的关注。讽刺的是，在美国大多数华人当时都未曾访问中国，且由于边境政策，有中国旅游史的民众很难回到美国。针对亚裔的种族歧视，似乎只能反映施暴者的愚昧和无知。

中国疫情好转了，北美的疫情却不断加剧。随着境外输入案例的不断增加，海外回到中国的旅客成为了政府和民众重点警觉的对象。一个月来，政府先是强制 14 天集中隔离，再禁止外国公民入境。民航局也在3月 29 日减少了航线，要求每个航空公司每个国家每周只保留一个航班。

“预防外国人”阴差阳错地成为了预防外来疫情的最明显对象。虽然北京3月复工，但我的一位美国籍编辑朋友却无法回到办公室，因为写字楼的物业不再让外国人进入。英国《卫报》的记者 Lily Kuo 在推特上写道，在入住上海一家酒店时，她因持有美国护照被拒绝入住，虽近期并无美国旅行历史。个别人士对防疫法律的不遵守，也让“洋垃圾”这类论述再次浮出水面。这些经历不只是单独的案例，而是对外国居民污名化可见的激增。

像其它国家的种族歧视一样，最严重的受害者往往是有色人种。在非洲裔人口密集的广州市，一家麦当劳门店写出英文告示，明确禁止黑人进入餐厅。该餐厅随后因压力道歉。据英国广播电台报道，大量非洲裔广州居民被无故强制检测，有些被放进隔离酒店并被房东驱逐。有居民表示，房产中介也拒绝出租给非洲人，导致不少人流落街头。虽然中国中央政府否认针对种族的区别对待，但这些令人不安的遭遇导致非洲数个国家政府召见中国大使，更是受到了非盟主席穆萨•法基的谴责。美国驻华大使馆也发布提示，警告非洲裔美国公民避免访穗。据《金融时报》报道，非洲部分国家在华外交官签署联名信，向中国外交部门表示抗议。

值得提出的是，这类歧视在中国的盛行也加剧了海外中国人面对的阻力，同时也伤害了中国的国家形象。仅仅在非洲就有近100万中国公民，且随着中企在当地越来越多的投资、中非合作的紧密，这个数字还在不断增加。多个非洲国家网民在推特上将矛头指向当地华人，用 “#ChinaGoHome”、“#ChinaMustExplain” 等标签挑起反华情绪。肯尼亚国会议员摩西•库里亚（Moses Kuria）甚至借此机会提议遣返在肯中国公民。与此同时，中国多年来努力建设的国家形象也将因此在世界局部破裂，而这种负面影响与矛盾也将反射到海外不少华人身上。

国内民众对“外来”面孔的恐惧和歧视，不免让我联想到在西方许多种族歧视者的愚昧。当然，这场疫情并不是中国排外主义和种族歧视的第一次展现。从 2016 年“俏比洗衣溶珠”事件，到 2018 年央视春晚“涂黑脸”（blackface）丑闻，再到近期外国人居留条例的改革，中文社交媒体上的主流观点似乎充满了沙文主义色彩和种族主义偏见。虽然不少人拒绝承认这些偏见存在的现实，但它们在这次疫情污名化的过程中凸显出来。

疫情期间在美国几个月里，我经常收到国内朋友、家人关切的讯息，怕我因亚洲面孔受到不公对待甚至是歧视性的暴力。我从未因为亚洲面孔被餐厅拒绝服务或被酒店拒绝入住，但这种恐惧也让我更容易地用同理心看待中国今天的一些排外主义情绪。事实上，官方数据显示，大多数境外输入疫情都来自以留学生为主的中国公民，外国护照持有者只占很小一部分。和中国人在美国的境况类似，新的入境政策已经导致外国公民无法进入中国，更没法像很多人想的那样将病毒带到国内。我3月中旬回到北京，比绝大多数在华长居的外国人携带病毒的风险高得多。

在这次疫情之中，恐惧心理超越了理性。排外现象里，虽然部分是一些政府部门的决策，但更常见的是民众和企业为“多一事不如少一事”而自作主张。一位加拿大好友在北京东直门一家商店被拒绝进入时，店主声称是上级规定。一个考虑不周的决定，可能会给他人带来数倍的困扰与麻烦。他打电话给当地政府，只得知没有这种要求，并让他下次遭遇类似情况时联络警察。其实，如果想要降低风险，与其通过肤色和国籍决断，不如参照近期的旅行历史，对中国人、外国人一视同仁——多问一个问题，增加一点信任，也许没有那么难。

己所不欲，勿施于人。在新冠病毒袭击全球的如今，别让排外情绪向病毒一样侵蚀我们的社会。

苏州评弹版（蒋）

Youtube 和 Spotify 二神器...

@rrrr #16 Be careful what you wish for!

@rrrr #14 嗯，虽说共喜欢不定时trigger一下国内的民族主义情绪，但现在也是唯一能压制这种自下而上民族主义的力量。在气放掉之前揭开高压锅盖似乎不是明智的选择。见谅！

@rrrr #10 我可没诅咒你，这难道不是现实么？

@rrrr #12 八楼不是你自己的么？？？

@rrrr #8 那还是让共继续压着你们吧~

但见新人笑，那闻旧人哭。

拉拢民族主义，觉得民族主义能为我所用，最终都逃不过被民族主义反噬的下场。

一个跨阵营的问题应该是如何消解民族主义。

并不希望看到一个民族主义的新中国。

@D5HD #3 大赞！

@sorrysorrysorry #4 落伍了，我还停留在‘美分’的说法上呢。

@sorrysorrysorry #2 那八千究竟是啥意思。。。

@sorrysorrysorry #6 这我也没听说过。。。

什么意思？

为什么不直接引用fox news的链接？

https://www.foxnews.com/politics/coronavirus-wuhan-lab-china-compete-us-sources

棒

告诉孩子们多备咸菜棒子面，再找口破缸把门顶上。

嚯, 手眼通天阿

坐楼杀惜

@笑翻江山 #3 别忘了自己也是‘第三世界’。

@笑翻江山 #3 当然资瓷。

@笑翻江山 #1 当初是谁把咱们抬进联合国的？‘一带一路’还搞不搞了？退一万步，己所不欲勿施于人。

@张怀义 #1 怎么知道是什么VPN

@puf夏 #4 是是是是，算我一个。

@沈魚飛鳥 #4 是。

您得是60后？

如若恰巧路过土耳其的话，推荐大家去趟加里波利。

钟俊峰先生的作品，刘派。

应景儿

https://www.ft.com/content/48f199b0-9054-4ab6-aaad-a326163c9285

shame, shame, shame...

老佛爷的接班人选得不好。

折冲姨硕。

试试

上下集

@Kotona #26 捂得了一时，捂得了一世？